@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Nozick,Robert},
subject = {Knowledge},
note = {II 185
Knowledge/Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./Nozick: E.g. I know that a pair of scissors is now in my drawer. - But it is not correct to say that if there is one there, that I would know then.
((s) So something can be true, even if the counterfactual conditional is false - namely, because the method can be crucial).
>Method/Nozick, >Counterfactual conditional.
((s) So the counterfactual conditional must mention the method.)
II 189
Gettier/Nozick: Gettier - examples conclude a truth often from a (justified believed) falsehood.
>E. Gettier, >Causal theory of knowledge, >Causal theory of reference, >Belief, >Justified assertibility.
Condition:
(3) if not-p> not- (S believes that p)
excludes that often.
II 194
Knowledge/belief/Nozick: through senile stubborness knowledge becomes belief. - Similar: E.g. knowledge of future brainwashing, then we try to "cement" belief.
II 194f
Knowledge/belief/local/global/Nozick: condition (3) should be better (indexicality, "now", "here") a local belief than a global one. - Otherwise danger of stubbornness.
>Index words, >Indexicality, >Reference, >Contextuality.
II 198
Need/possibility/knowledge/Nozick: if ~ p> ~ (S believes that p) necessary condition for knowledge, then possibility of skepticism shows that no knowledge exists.
>Skepticism.
II 204 f
Knowledge/non-seclusion/NozickVsskepticism: Knowledge is not closed under known logical implication (VsSkepticism.
>Closure.
Skepticism: knowledge is closed: that is the (skeptical) principle of closure of knowledge:
K (p >> q) & Kp> Kq:
I should know allegedly the implied by the known?
Notation: K = knowledge, operator "somebody knows".
Nozick: but that would be merely belief, not knowledge.
Cf. >Logical Omniscience.
II 206
The situation where q is wrong, could be quite different from the one where p is false. - E.g. that you were born in a certain city, implies that you were born on Earth, but not vice versa.
II 227
Non-closure of knowledge: means, that knowledge will vary with the facts, because it is in connection with them.
>Covariance.
Knowledge/belief/closeness/Nozick: merely true belief is complete under known logical implication. - Because knowledge is more true belief, we need an additional condition that is not-complete under implication.
Belief is only knowledge when it covaries with facts. - But that is not enough - it depends on what happens if p is false.
Problem: a co-varying belief with facts is not closed.
Punchline: because knowledge involves belief, it is not closed.
VsSkepticism: the argument of skepticism needs the fact that knowledge needs covariance.
II 223
Knowledge/induction/connection/Nozick: knowledge is based on facts that would otherwise have been different.
Nozick: In the past. - Therefore, the relevant non-p-world is not a possible world, which is so far identical with the real world (the actual world), and diverges from now on immediately.
>Possible worlds.
It is logically possible that it begins to diverge in a moment.
((s) elsewhere Lewis like Nozick: in the past there would have had to be a change, if I now suddenly act differently).
We have connections to the facts in the past that determine our predictions. >Determinism/Lewis, >Covariance.
II 227
Knowing that (x)Px is unequal knowledge that every single thing is P: the universal quantification has different truth conditions as the all-removal. - "(x)Px" could be wrong, although "Pa" true.},
note = { No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994
},
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url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=286103}
}