@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Logic Texts}, subject = {Knowledge}, note = {Read III 202 Knowledge/Read: from knowledge follows truth. >Truth. --- Sainsbury V 141 Knowledge paradox/unexpected examination/Sainsbury: it does not matter that the students might have expectations which they are not entitled to have. V 143 It is precisely because we believe that we have refused the teacher, and that we have thus taken away the opportunity from her to let the work be written, makes the announcement come true again. Variant: the class knows of the truth of the announcement. Then n can show the class that she cannot know that it is true. Variant: the announcement also contains the fact that the class does not know because of the announcement ... - E.g. A1 "You will not know on the morning in question ..." - questionable principle: "If you know ... then you know, that one knows it. "- N.B.: a paradox occurs only when we have to conclude on W(A1). V 148 Variant: Announcement: A2 either [M and non-WM (If A2, then M)] or [D and non-WD (If A2, then D)] - New: this is self-referential - Problem: then you know on Tuesday (If A2, then D) that A2 is wrong.V V 150 Real knowledge paradox/Sainsbury: A3 W (non-A3) e.g. the man knows that the announcement is wrong -that is how we come to MV 3 (...) inter alia: "What is proved is known". - MV 3: 1. Assumed, A3 2. W (non-A3) (definition of A3) 3. Non-A3 (which is known is true) 4. If A3, then non-A3 - (1-3 combined) 5. Non-A3 (after 4.) 6. Non-W (non A3) (according to 5. + definition of A3) 7. W (non-A3) - (5. + what is proved is known). - 6 and 7 contradict each other. V 160 Locus classicus: Montague/Kaplan. V 155 Believe paradox/Sainsbury: G1 a does not believe what G1 says - if a G1 believes, then he can understand that he says something wrong. - Contains two assumptions: 1) that a can understand that G1 is false, if he believes in it, and true, if he does not believe in it. 2) that a will understand what he can understand - now one can construct through inserting of rationality, self-consciousness, as well as unity and understanding, the paradox analogously to the paradox of knowledge. V 156 Self-consciousness: If G(f), then G[G(f)]. Reasonableness: If G(f) then non-G (non-G). Closure: If G (if f, then y) and G (non-y), then G (non-f). - Although believe does not involve knowledge, one can construct the same paradox. V 160/61 Knowledge/believe/knowledge paradox/Sainsbury: there is a discussion as to whether knowledge or belief should be correctly represented by an operator or a predicate. E.g. Operator: A1 is true. E.g. predicative: it will have to do with names of expressions, rather than with their use. Montague/Kaplan: predicative version, to rule out that operators are to blame.}, note = { Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=286094} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=286094} }