@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Fodor,Jerry},
subject = {Truth Theory},
note = {IV 60
Theory of truth/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: a theory of truth is extensionally adequate when all of its T-sentences are true.
Problem: this is not sufficient. E.g. the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green.
Solution:. material adequacy instead of extensional adequacy. >Extensionality, >Equivalence.
That is, that P must be a translation of S.
This is Tarski s Convention T. >Convention T.
Problem: "Translation" - "adequate", "synonym", etc. are unclear concepts. >Translation, >Synonymy, >Adequacy.
Problem: when radical interpretation would be defined by material adequacy, it would be impossible. Solution/Davidson: truth as the fundamental concept.},
note = { F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
},
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url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=282964}
}