@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Tugendhat, E.},
subject = {Truth},
note = {I 263
Truth/Tugendhat: an assertion is once and for all true or false, it does not depend on the circumstances or on a situation.
>Timeless sentence.
I 267
Truth/Tugendhat: One must not have reasons for truth, but know them - difference using reasons/truth reason. - Otherwise lie and deception would be excluded.
>Deception.
I 285
Truth/Tugendhat: only made possible by reference to spatiotemporal objects - but reference only possible in controlled language use.
>Reference.
VsRussell: not by pseudo-concept idea.
---
III 190
Truth/Tarski/Tugendhat: his definition is not related to verification - TugendhatVsTarski: Scheme to narrow - Reality and subjectivity must be taken into the truth-conception -
>Verification, >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski,
>Theory of truth/Tarski.
Tugendhat VsMetalanguage
>Metalanguage.
Judgments point beyond themselves, therefore criteria necessary.
>Criteria, >Truth criterion.
III 196
Tugendhat: we need to know how we can verify a judgment, otherwise meaningless.
>Judgments.
III 208
The "dual relationship" (sentence-sense-given), evaporates with Tarski to a simple ratio.
>Given, >Correspondence theory.},
note = { Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=282354}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=282354}
}