@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Tugendhat, E.}, subject = {Truth}, note = {I 263 Truth/Tugendhat: an assertion is once and for all true or false, it does not depend on the circumstances or on a situation. >Timeless sentence. I 267 Truth/Tugendhat: One must not have reasons for truth, but know them - difference using reasons/truth reason. - Otherwise lie and deception would be excluded. >Deception. I 285 Truth/Tugendhat: only made possible by reference to spatiotemporal objects - but reference only possible in controlled language use. >Reference. VsRussell: not by pseudo-concept idea. --- III 190 Truth/Tarski/Tugendhat: his definition is not related to verification - TugendhatVsTarski: Scheme to narrow - Reality and subjectivity must be taken into the truth-conception - >Verification, >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski. Tugendhat VsMetalanguage >Metalanguage. Judgments point beyond themselves, therefore criteria necessary. >Criteria, >Truth criterion. III 196 Tugendhat: we need to know how we can verify a judgment, otherwise meaningless. >Judgments. III 208 The "dual relationship" (sentence-sense-given), evaporates with Tarski to a simple ratio. >Given, >Correspondence theory.}, note = { Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=282354} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=282354} }