@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Field,Hartry}, subject = {Vocabulary}, note = {II 237 Deflationism/VsDeflationism: is it possible that most of our present scientific concepts have less power in a deflationist perspective? >Deflationism, >Concepts, >Observation, >Explanation, >Theory language. Field: perhaps this is so: deflationism shows that there is no best translation of Newtonian terms into modern language. >Theory change, >Meaning change. New Vocabulary/Field: can often be captured with old vocabulary plus higher-order quantification. This is e.g. a Ramsey sentence. >Conservativity, >Ramsey sentence, >Quantification, >Description levels, >Levels (Order). II 267 Applying/Explaining/Observing/Field: our observation practice explains how our physical vocabulary applies to all that and only that to which it applies to. - This explains why some non-standard models are unintended. >Satisfaction, >Reference, >Unintended models, >Models, >Model theory. II 355 Undefined/Language/McGee/Field: = Having non-standard models. Solution: Extension by predicate: e.g. "standard natural number". FieldVs: that is cheating. >Expansion/Field. New axioms with new vocabulary are not better than new axioms in the old vocabulary. Cheating: If it was to be assumed that the new predicates have certain extensions. - (Yet FieldVsIndeterminism) --- III 9 Pure Mathematics/Application/Field: E.g. Number theory: is not applicable to the world. - For example, set theory: must allow primordial elements for the application. Solution: "impure mathematics": Functions that map physical objects to numbers - Then the comprehension axioms must also contain non-mathematical vocabulary. E.g. instances of the separation axiom. >Comprehension.}, note = { Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=281742} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=281742} }