@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Simons,Peter M.},
subject = {Four-Dimensionalism},
note = {I 121
Four-Dimensionalism/flux/Simons (instead continuants): then Tib and Tibbles do not share all parts. But non-identity does not exclude mereological extensionality.
>Mereology, >Extensionality, >Extensional mereology.
I 122
Four-Dimensionalism/flux/Simons: e.g. "Tibbles at t": is an instantaneous three-dimensional phase or time-slice of the four-dimensional object Tibbles.
>Tibbles-example.
Predicates: predicates in four-dimensionalism are "eternal". The change is supported by the terms ((s) nouns). Then Tibbles equals a cat process. Then we cannot say Tib + Tail because this is different, although they have all parts in common. Then this is no longer extensionality. To save these, modality must be denied de re. Four-Dimensionalism pro extensionality, VsModality de re. "Time slice": a "time slice" is still a whole human. ((s) The "thinness" lies in the time period.)
Quine: physical objects in four-dimensional space time are indistinguishable from processes.
>Four-dimensionalism/Quine.},
note = { Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=281682}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=281682}
}