@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Simons,Peter M.}, subject = {Four-Dimensionalism}, note = {I 121 Four-Dimensionalism/flux/Simons (instead continuants): then Tib and Tibbles do not share all parts. But non-identity does not exclude mereological extensionality. >Mereology, >Extensionality, >Extensional mereology. I 122 Four-Dimensionalism/flux/Simons: e.g. "Tibbles at t": is an instantaneous three-dimensional phase or time-slice of the four-dimensional object Tibbles. >Tibbles-example. Predicates: predicates in four-dimensionalism are "eternal". The change is supported by the terms ((s) nouns). Then Tibbles equals a cat process. Then we cannot say Tib + Tail because this is different, although they have all parts in common. Then this is no longer extensionality. To save these, modality must be denied de re. Four-Dimensionalism pro extensionality, VsModality de re. "Time slice": a "time slice" is still a whole human. ((s) The "thinness" lies in the time period.) Quine: physical objects in four-dimensional space time are indistinguishable from processes. >Four-dimensionalism/Quine.}, note = { Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=281682} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=281682} }