@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 19 Mar 2024}, author = {Dummett,Michael E.}, subject = {Verificationism}, note = {II 112ff Disjunction/Verification/Meaning Theory/Dummett: quite different than in the intuitionist logic: e.g. it was either an even or odd number of geese on the Capitol - should not have to guarantee that any one of the disjuncts can be verified - then the law of the excluded middle is assertible even if the sentence itself is undecidable. II 123 Verificationist Meaning Theory/Dummett: results from the assumption that we cannot have any concept of a fact that we cannot see - Important argument: then the non-occurrence of a non-discernible fact is not in itself another fact. -> anti-realism). - Then the fact that an assertion cannot be seen as neither correct nor incorrect is to be shown sufficiently that it can be neither correct nor incorrect - that only leads to bivalency in realism. II 126 Verific. Meaning Theory/Correctness/Realism/Anti-Realism/Dummett: a) Verificationist meaning theory: truth conditions visible: then two options: 1) assertion correct if shown that it is impossible to be incorrect - 2) incorrect, if not displayable as correct b) Realism: truth conditions not visible: then there is no difference, because the incorrectness conditions always exist if the correctness conditions do not exist, and vice versa - II 126 but even here incorrectness prevails. II 126 Verificationist Meaning Theory/Dummett: needs only effective, decidable concepts - (not realistic) - but neither classical nor intuitionistic logic! II 126 Meaning Theory/Verification/Logical Form/Dummett: double negation: ~~A l- A and l-A > ~~A but not A l- ~~A - also: l- A v ~A, l- ~(A & ~A), ~(A & B) -ll- ~A v ~B, ~(A v B) l- ~A & ~B, but not: ~A & ~ B l- ~(A v B).}, note = { Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=280296} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=280296} }