@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Quine,W.V.O.},
subject = {Underdetermination},
note = {X 25ff
Underdetermination/Empiricism/Quine: also through unmonitored data.
---
Lauener XI 119
Underdetermination/Identity of theories/Quine/Lauener: theories: can be logically incompatible and empirically equivalent. - E.g. interchanging -electron/molecule-: makes true sentences false.
Since the change is purely terminological, you can say that both versions express the same theory. - So they are empirically equivalent - however, the predicates can be reconstructed in a way that the theories also become logically equivalent.
E.g. empirically equivalent:
Theory a) space infinite
Theory b) finite, objects shrink with distance from the center.
Again, the predicates can be rephrased in such a way that the theories are logically equivalent. Underdetermination: In order to prove them, it would have to have an influence on the empirical content.
Quine: it is almost impossible to find an example.
---
Lauener XI 120
Underdetermination/Quine/Lauener: there are rivals to every infinite theory that are equivalent empirically, but not logically, and that cannot be made logically equivalent by reconstructing the predicates.
---
Stroud I 217
Underdetermination/Theory/Theoretical terms/Entities/Quine/Stroud: the truths that the scientist introduces e.g. about molecules are not sufficiently determined by all the truths that he knows or can ever know about the normal objects. - (s) There could be several possible theories which imply the same set of truths about the normal objects, but differ in terms of the theoretical ones. - theoretical entities do not follow from the truths about normal things.
Quine/Stroud: for him, normal objects are also just hypotheses. - This is how all theories go beyond data. - Underdetermination: also remains, if we included all past and future nervous stimuli of all people.
---
I 234
Problem: even true sentences go beyond the data, are projections - therefore they cannot be known.
>Theories; cf. >Indeterminacy, >Inscrutability.},
note = { Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 },
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}