@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Stalnaker,Robert}, subject = {Impossible World}, note = {I 58 Contradiction/LewisVsImpossible World/Lewis: there is no object, no matter how fantastic, about which one could say the truth by contradicting oneself. >Existence, >Non-existence, >Contradictions. I 58 Impossible world/Stalnaker: problem: If the possible world is defined by a contradiction P and ~P, this contradiction is transmitted to the real world through the modal operator "in w, P" because it is then true in the real world that it is true in the other possible world. I 59 Another problem: if there is an impossible world, the possible world with P and those with ~P are no longer complements. >Complementarity. Problem: even the most bizarre possible world will not be at the same time in a set of possible worlds and its complement. I 62 Solution: new definition of impossible world: an impossible world is a world about which a contradiction is true. This does not makes the real world impossible. I 63 Impossible world/Actualism/Stalnaker: the actualist has no problems with an impossible world, because he/she can simply understand them as conflicting sets of propositions. >Actualism/Stalnaker. LewisVs/LewisVsErsatz world: conversely, propositions are sets of possible worlds. >ersatz world.}, note = { Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=278353} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=278353} }