@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Quine,W.V.O.}, subject = {Inscrutability of reference}, note = {II 33 Inscrutability of reference: there is no difference between: x is a dog or: x is the space time portion that is filled by a dog. Only the Statement about the terminology is used and its translation, it is not about physical objects (representative function). Inscrutability: occurs in translation or permutation. VI 71 Analytical hypothesis/Translation manual/Quine: is done term by term translation. Problem: then meaningful sentences may arise which refer to something else. This is the inscrutability of reference. XII 58 Inscrutability/Reference/Quine: goes much deeper than indeterminacy of translation: even within a language, even if the apparatus of individuation (plural, pronoun, identity, quantification, etc.) is assumed to be fixed. - E.g. protosyntax: (only strings of signs of one type (1st stage) - in that case, expressions are always types, not tokens. >Translation/Quine, >Indeterminacy/Quine. ad XII 64 Non-factualism/(s): if something is indeterminate in principle, then there is no fact to explore. - Quine: e.g. if meaning is a property of the behavior, the inscrutability of reference cannot lie in the inscrutability of a fact - because there is nothing to investigate. But it probably makes a difference whether one refers to rabbits or parts, - or e.g. to the formulas or Goedel numbers. Because then there would be no difference between them. Reference would lose its meaning. But the difference is not tangible, neither through the behavior nor through ostension. -> Indeterminacy/Quine. - Formulas: have different properties than numbers. XII 65 Reversed spectra/Inscrutability/Quine: corresponds to the problem rabbit/part (Gavagai). Only that there is no frame of reference (apparatus of individuation). It can never be found out. Things are reversed, properties are retained. ((s) Things do not change sides, properties). XII 66 Pointing/Ontological relativity/Inscrutability/Quine: you cannot point to absolute location or speed. -Just as you cannot point to rabbits or parts. (> Gavagai/Quine).}, note = { Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=277566} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=277566} }