@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Fodor,Jerry}, subject = {Transcendentals}, note = {IV 79 Transcendental/argument/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: Davidson's transcendental argument for the principle of charity takes this form: if we do not assume that the speaker rightly believes most things, then language acquisition by the radical interpreter is impossible. >Radical interpretation, >Language acquisition. IV 80 Language acquisition is possible, however. So it must be assumed that most of the speaker's beliefs are true. >Beliefs/Davidson. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: there is no clear reason to believe the second premise (that radical interpretation is possible). Therefore, the transcendental argument fails. IV 105 Transcendental: what made the arguments transcendental was the assumption that radical interpretation is metaphysically impossible if holism does not apply. >Holism. --- Kripke I 46 Metaphysical/Kripke: what could have been different is precisely a question that cannot be answered empirically at all, hence it is metaphysical. Contrary: epistemic.}, note = { F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=275194} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=275194} }