@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Frege,Gottlob}, subject = {Clauses}, note = {Dummett III 7 Subsentence/indirect speech/question: in the subsentence, singular terms do not stand for the object, but for its sense - this is the only case in which a (sub-)sentence stands for the proposition. Tradition: subsentences are not truth-functional. FregeVs. >Singular terms, >Objects, >Sense, >Thought, >Truth functions, >Propositions, >That-clauses. - - - Frege II 54 Description/Subordinate Clause: the discoverer of the planetary orbits = object: Kepler. (Meaning (reference): has no truth value. The meaning of the subordinate clause is not a complete thought (it cannot be the main clause). II 62 Subordinate Clause/Subsentence/Meaning/Truth Value/tr.val./Frege: e.g. Bebel beleived that the return of Alsace-Lorraine will appease the feeling of vengeance of France. Here, two ideas are implicit: 1) That Bebel believes that. 2) That it is wrong. The first meaning: is a thought. The second meaning: is a truth value. Therefore, the subordinate clause is actually to be taken twice. Since the truth value is not the whole meaning, we cannot just replace it. Similar: e.g. knowledge, recognition, "it is known". II 63 Subordinate Clauses/Subordinate Clause/Frege: e.g. false belief implies two meanings: a thought and a truth value. Propositional attitudes are similar. >Propositional attitudes. - - - IV 69 Description/Subordinate Clause/Subsentence/Name/Frege: e.g. "The negation of the idea that 3 is greater than 5". Here, this term refers to a specific individual thing. This individual thing is a thought. The definite article turns the whole expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name. >Proper names.}, note = { F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=273754} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=273754} }