@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Kant,Immanuel}, subject = {Synthesis}, note = {Danto I 133 Synthetic a priori/Kant: before any exploration of the world recognizable - on this he builds the mere possibility of doing philosophy at all. - Because it is non-empirical- Analytically/Kant: E.g. "Every cause has an effect." - Not analytically: "All events have causes." - It does not belong to the meaning of "event" that it has a cause. - But still synthetically a priori: - E.g. "Every event has a cause". - (Variation of Leibniz's law). - It defines what it means for the universe to be intellectually understandable. >Apperception, >apprehension, >Subject/Kant, >Experience/Kant. --- Danto I 211 Experience/representation/continuity/internalism/Danto: continuity is not given in experience. - Otherwise, there would not be the question of whether existence is continuous. Solution/Kant: mental synthesis. --- Strawson V 26 Synthesis/Kant: the process of production of the unity of experience - there cannot be empirical knowledge of the synthesis - is only obtained through it. V 81 Synthesis/Kant: aware, but not how I appear to myself, but only that I am. - Thinking, not watching. - Kant/Strawson: Kant Synthesis is based on differentiation of the capabilities of sensibility and understanding. - StrawsonVs: We try without them. --- Bubner I 100 Judgment/Synthesis/Kant: the unity of the synthetically summarized gives the questionable relationship of concepts the necessary determinateness. This determinateness also bears the reference to the object, which is always included in the judgment as a knowledge claim. "Synthesis alone is what actually collects the elements into knowledge and unites them to a certain content." This is achieved by the fact that Kant equals (definition) terms with conceptual contents. >Judgment/Kant. --- I 103 Synthesis/Kant: it is originally unified and equally valid for all connections. The reference to the action also seems to answer the question of unity. ((s) because it comes from activity, not from the objects). It contains three moments: 1. the given manifold 2. the connecting 3. the unit There is no independent "unit pole", which, so to speak, appears as one of the many elements next to the connecting elements. The unity is not opposed to the many as an isolated principle. Therefore idealism speaks of the identity of identity and non-identity. --- I 104 Unity/Synthesis/Idealism/Kant: the place of unity can now be designated, it is the pure action-character of the synthesis. This action-character goes beyond all individual connections, preceds all actual combinations, and is never to be exhausted by so many synthetic acts. >Unity/Kant. --- I 108 Synthesis/Vs Kant: his successors have revealed the weakness that there is no evidence for the highest point of this thought chain.}, note = { Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=272656} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=272656} }