@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Nagel,Thomas}, subject = {Skepticism}, note = {I 19 Subjectivism/Skepticism: says that there is no ability of such universal applicability and validity within us tp verify and substantiate our judgments. I 22ff Skepticism/Relativism: Reason cannot be criticized without using reason at any other point to formulate this criticism. >Reason, >Circular reasoning. I 31 Skepticism: a skepticism generated by reasoning can not be total. >Justification. I 31 ff Skepticism: in order to criticize it, one should not understand it as a widely applicable trivial empty phrase, but as something concrete, in order to turn the tables. This allows the conflict betw the inner content of the thoughts and the relativizing external view to be openly recognized. >Perspective, >Propositional content, >Thoughts, >Content. Subjectivism aims at a phenomenological reduction of thought to get out of them. This cannot succeed. Attempts to relativize the objectivity of a conceptual scheme fail for the same reason. E.g. I cannot say "I believe that p, but this is merely a psychological fact that affects me. As for the truth, I do not settle". I 89 NagelVsDescartes: demon: the idea of ​​confused thoughts also contains the disentangled ones. I 92 NagelVsSkepticism: may not use arguments at all - a false calculation cannot be made right by saying that a demon had confused it. I 94 Logical skepticism/NagelVsSkepticism/Nagel: we can never reach a point where there are two possibilities that are compatible with all evidence. I cannot imagine that I am in a similar realization situation where 2 + 2 = 5, but my brain would be confused, because I could not imagine that 2 + 2 = 5. The logical skeptic offers no level of reason. - There is no point that allows reviewing the logic without presupposing it. - Not everything can be revised. - Something has to be maintained in order to check that the revision is justified.}, note = { NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=268342} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=268342} }