@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Grover, D. L.}, subject = {Semantic Facts}, note = {Horwich I 358 Semantic Facts/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: e.g. if "that’s true" is true, then there is a corresponding fact - this is a semantic fact. Problem/Field: how can physicalism express that? A single fact is e.g. that snow is white. Solution/CGB: a non-semantic equivalent of the truth predicate is non-extensional, as an agreed definiens, expressing a "pre-theoretical truth concept" - instead of irreducible semantic facts (CGBVs "Facts About Truth"). There are also other semantic facts, e.g. about reference, about synonymy. These may not be physicalistically eliminable (CampVs, GroverVs, BelnapVs). >Prosentential theory, >Reference, >Synonmy.}, note = { Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=266854} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=266854} }