@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Quine,W.V.O.}, subject = {Sentences}, note = {I 252f "Purely indicative" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - An expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative - ambiguous reference. - Every truth function is denotation-transparent. I 332 Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variables: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after the elimination of the singular term. - The proposition resists a change of the truth value. - The proposition remains nameless in "x0p". I 337 Sentence: is not the class of its expressions, otherwise non-expressed sentenceswould be = zero class (all would have the same meaning). - A sentence is not a property of expressions either. - Solution: sentence as a consequence: class of pairs. - Partial sign: class of expression incidents. I 336 Words describe - sentences do not (no singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has a meaning: the singular term is formed by bracketing the sentence. (not a proposition!) - Proposition here: completion of the correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? denotes nothing. --- Prior I 35 Sentence/Quine: is not an object - Then also no quantification, no bound variables for it - PriorVsQuine: unproblematic: E.g. "J. believes p": J. does not believe anything, this ultimately stands for a sentence. --- Quine VII (f) 109ff Sentence/QuineVsFrege: sentences must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" not as variables, accept the entities as entities named through expressions as values. --- X 31 Sentence/Quine: we speak only of sentences if we want to generalize - (and we cannot do that through objects). X 35 Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in one dimension, which cannot be grasped by a variable. --- XII 39 Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead Proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S - English Translation: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - "QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence. Quine: still not accepts linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitude: too artificial. >Propositional attitudes.}, note = { Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=264801} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=264801} }