@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 19 Mar 2024}, author = {Wright,Crispin}, subject = {Rules}, note = {I 260f Rules only exist within a practice, which is maintained by the fact that the parties are in agreement. >Convention, >Community, >Language community. Rules/Wittgenstein/Wright: whatever Wittgenstein's dialectic exactly achieves it forces in any case some kind of restriction for a realistic idea of rules and meaning. >Realism. And therefore also for truth, because truth is a function of meaning. >Truth, >Meaning. Rule-following/Wright: shows that judgments about meanings and that what corresponds to these conditionally, are withdrawn from cognitive coercion. And then the same must also apply to claims about the truth of sentences. >Cognitive coercion, >Rule following. This intuitive reasoning is therefore not a trivial solipsism and the ghost of a global minimalism (Boghossian) is still among us. >Nonfactualism, >Minimalism/Wright. I 288 Rule-following/Wright: in the three other areas of discourse (without evidence transcendence as in mathematics) however, it appears that they are biased by considerations to rule consequences. These considerations may 1. prevent the formulation itself, and prevent that the problem appears solvable at all 2. discover misconceptions, presented jointly by the opponents, 3. affect the result from the outset in favor of minimalism. 4. Difficulty: how can we achieve the desired realism of objectivity, if our response to a problem will never be able to free itself from a dependence on skills and aptitudes to spontaneous reactions whose own state is drawn into doubt with respect to objectivity. >Objectivity. --- Rorty VI 55ff WrightVsDavidson: Cognitive bid, language, meaning, truth and knowledge would collapse if there is no offense in relation to what we call "addition". >Nonfactualism, >Cognitive coercion, >Quaddition, >Facts, >D. Davidson. --- II 225 Rules/Wright: not in the same language. >Metalanguage, >Object language. Exception: an expression of what someone understands when he understands "red": can be formulated in the same language. >Understanding. Chess: not from the inside/(s) otherwise learnable by observation - then never certain whether these are all rules, or if not in reality quite different rules. >Chess. Prevailing view/Wright: the prevailing view is that rules can be recognized from the inside out. WrightVs: that would demand that language use can be explained as an application of rules. - That excludes to see it at the same time as a game (as actually desired). II 226 Rules/vagueness/Wright: problem when applying predicates which should be guided by rules: then in the case of vagueness simultaneous application and non-application prescribed when overlapping. >Vagueness, >Predication, >Attribution.}, note = { WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=261714} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=261714} }