@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Logic Texts}, subject = {Reductionism}, note = {Read III 28 Reductionism: was central for Wittgenstein. For Russell it was quite clear that the assumption of an additional fact between two statements was absurd and unnecessary: E.g. "Kennedy is President," and "Oswald killed Kennedy," a third fact, a sort of conjunctural fact that makes the connection absurd and lavish. >Atomism, >Atomic sentences. If you know the two separate facts, you learn nothing new when you connect them. There is no extra fact behind the link, which is added to the separated facts. Similar to disjunctive. What makes "A or B" true is not another strange disjunctive fact, but exactly the same fact that makes one of the two limbs true! >Fact. Otherwise regress. >Regress. III 30 Reductionism: would have to declare the truth of a negative statement like "Ruby did not kill Kennedy" as the result of the truth of another statement that would be incompatible with "Ruby killed Kennedy." III 31 RussellVsReductionism: argues against such argumentation that a regress threatens: "B is incompatible with A" is itself a negative statement. To explain its truth, we would need a third statement C which is incompatible with "C is compatible with A," and so on. ReadVsRussell: this is a strange objection, because it would also be valid against any conjunction. And then truth conditions for conjunctive and disjunctive statements must not be subjunctive or disjunctive. >Disjunction, >Conjunction.}, note = { Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=261120} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=261120} }