@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Fodor,Jerry},
subject = {Rationality},
note = {IV 15
Rationality/rationality/law/Fodor/Lepore: nothing that would comply with a law of precise science will decide what is rational or irrational.
IV 117
Rationality/Fodor/Lepore: rationality restricts believe attribution: one cannot believe that p and at the same time believe that not-p, but not for content: you can have contradictory content even contradictory propositional attitudes are possible. Meaning is not rationalistically limited either: one sentence can express p and not-p at the same time. Wishes can be contradictory.
IV 130
Intentional attribution is not limited by rationality, because representations may be irrational (inconsistent) or fantastic.
Fodor/LeporeVs: that would be a change of subject, irrational propositional attitudes would be no intentional states.
Constitutive of belief: rationality is not at the same time p and not-p, but objects of intentional states may be contradictory. >Contradictions, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental states, >Propositional attitudes.},
note = { F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=260099}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=260099}
}