@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Field,Hartry}, subject = {Ontology}, note = {I 166 Logic/Ontology/Crispin Wright: instead of logical equivalence (e.g., between Platonist propositions on directions and nominalistic propositions on parallel lines): "conceptual necessity" - from a conceptual explanation. >Necessity, >Equivalence, >Explanation. If Fx is a (finally instantiated) term, then there is a thing so that hx:Fx. FieldVsWright: that would also apply to God. Solution: Conditional: "If there is a God ...". --- II 102 Properties/Ontology/Philosophy of mind/Field: in the philosophy of mind, one can assume certain properties that are simultaneously denied in the ontology. --- III 3 Physics/Ontology/Field: I make strong assumptions about the nature and structure of physical objects (also subatomic particles). Also about postulated unobservables. - ((s) In return, he avoids strong assumptions about the mathematics that deals with it). >Theoretical entities, >Mathematical entities, >Mathematics, >Physics. III 4 I will not screw my structural assumptions to a level below Platonism. ((s) That is, the assumption that the unobservable (e.g. subatomic particles) exist). >Platonism, >Unobservables.}, note = { Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=252661} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=252661} }