@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Quine,W.V.O.}, subject = {Objectivity}, note = {I 29 Objectivity: people of normal vision as well as red-green-blind are trained in the same way. I 24 The company's method: to reward "Ouch" if the speaker shows further signs of discomfort. Trained in a way that the speaker says this even on stimuli that are not visible to her what she deems appropriate. When the man visibly looks at something red, the utterance "red" is rewarded. With regard to "red" there is a symmetry of verifiability, which is missing in the sense of "Ouch". "Ouch" is to a greater degree subjective. "Ouch" is not independent of social training. II 85 It is a bitter irony that such a vital distinction as that between good and evil should have no comparable claim to objectivity. Everyone who deals with moral problems refers to causal relationships. The number of ethical axioms can be reduced to a minimum by causal feedback. Utilitarianism is a remarkable example of such systematization. For example, for the settlement of conflicts: Problem of white lie: if we agree that truthfulness is not an end in itself, but only a means to higher morality, the problem becomes a question of science or technology. On the one hand, the usefulness of language requires an overweight of truthfulness, on the other hand, truth can hurt. >Truth/Quine. II 113 Austin's introspection contrasts with linguistics. He gains objectivity through "group introspection" (Urmson). For example, an exotic linguist would probably first find out what we designate with "male dog". But he could never find out what "bachelors" are. He must question all test subjects individually and later apply a society-related summation. II 180 Mathematical objectivity: For example, the continuum hypothesis but also its negation can be added to the axioms of set theory. Do these results cast doubt on the objectivity of mathematical truth? VI 48 Theory/Existence/Ontology/Quine: when a theory is about the radical question of what exists at all, quantification can only play the role of the arbitrator over questions of existence within the framework of a standardized and regulated form of language; a language that goes beyond truth functions (not, or, and). >Existence/Quine. VI 49 The objectivity of our knowledge remains rooted in our causal contact with external reality.}, note = { Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=252481} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=252481} }