@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Field,Hartry}, subject = {Nonfactualism}, note = {II 183 Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: E.g. relativistic mass or net weight in the Special Relativity Theory: - no fact decides which hypothesis is to be assumed. - The laws are, however, in some cases easier to formulate, depending on the choice. >Facts, >Relativity theory. II 224 Fact/discourse without facts/Nonfactualism/Field: 1. Questions of vagueness (Sorites): E.g. there is no fact, to which "bare" precisely refers. 2. assessment questions/morality/ethics. 3. sentences with indicators/index words. 4. Subjunctive conditional/counterfactual conditional >Counterfactual conditionals, >Index words, >Indexicality. >Vagueness, >Sorites. II 241 Nonfactualism/Factualism/Reference Framework/Relativity/Field: Nonfactualist: has a relativized T-predicate - but for him there is no "real" time order. Deflationism: distinguishes nonfactualism/factualism on the basis of accepted sentences. >Deflationism. Problem: also the factualist could have a relativized concept by introducing it as a basic concept. - E.g. "cosmically privileged framework". - Then one can no longer distinguish factualism and nonfactualism. Solution: to ask the factualist why his framework is privileged a) if he speaks of scientific exceptions, it is distinguishable from nonfactualism b) if unscientific, then indistinguishable. II 242 Nonfactualism/ethics: does not have to say that the sentences have no truth values. - It can say that the truth value ascriptions do not have the factual status, as the assertions themselves. >Truth values, >Ethics. Problem: if you only have the disquotation scheme, how should you state what is not entirely supported by facts? Solution: everyday language: also contains an (implicit) fact operator. >Everyday language. FieldVs: the rules for this are unclear. II 243 Nonfactualism/Ethics/non-deflationism/Gibbard/Field: (Gibbard 1990)(1): admits that evaluations have a factual component - factual and nonfactual must be connected in one and the same analysis. Sets of ordered pairs of possible worlds and standard systems, so that an utterance is true in this world according to this norm. Possible world: is here a complete specification of factual information. >Norms, >Possible worlds. II 244 But it does not contain any "normative facts". Complete norm: associates with each evaluative predicate a non-evaluative equivalent - E.g. "maximizes utility". >Utilitarianism. Nonfactualism: Thesis: the real world contains no "normative facts". N.B.: this non-existence is not a normative fact on its part. Otherwise, error theory: Thesis: "It is a fact that there are no facts". - Then: E.g.: "We should do this and that, according to norm N": is itself not norm-dependent but factual. II 254 Factualism/Field: Factualism does not postulate here a realm of facts, which the nonfactualist denies. Everything that the factualist asserts can be expressed by the nonfactualist by "~ A v B" (negation and disjunction). ((s) Then there is no antecedent that is made false by the absence of facts and thus creates a trivially true consequence.) 1. Gibbard, Alan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.}, note = { Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=251662} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=251662} }