@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Meixner,Uwe}, subject = {Nominalism}, note = {I 87 Nominalism/Meixner: the thesis that all entities are individuals. I 88 These words must then be concrete sound events or concrete inscriptions for the nominalist. The word "word" in turn must not denote a type object (also called "ontological individualism"). Radical nominalism/Meixner: Thesis: That all entities are actual individuals. Most radical nominalism/Meixner: Thesis: All entities are actual physical individuals. Materialism/Meixner: Materialism would like to represent the most radical nominalism, but it turns out that only a restricted nominalism can be represented. Reconstructive nominalism: thesis: all entities are individuals and the basic individuals (BI) are physical, but at the same time: 1. most individuals (including BI) are non-actual 2. all sets over BI are also individuals (honorific "physical"). Then universals can be regarded as individual-like entities. a) Variant of Carnap: basic individuals taken as individuals. b) David Lewis: BI on the contrary equated with maximally consistent individuals. (Sets of properties). >Actualism, >Possibilism, >D. Lewis. I 94 Nominalism: Thesis: There are no true-making entities. >Universals, >Truthmakers. Extreme nominalism: must change the language. >Everyday language, >Ontology.}, note = { Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=251581} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=251581} }