@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Quine,W.V.O.}, subject = {Morphemes}, note = {VII (c) 52 Morpheme: is the smallest unit of meaning - Quine: is a simply convenient classification of included phoneme intermediate stage in the division of the class K of character sequences - if we allow open morpheme categories, the class K of meaningful strings stops to be a formal construction from phonemes - ((s) because the elements are vague.) The Orthodox way is to draw up a list of the "morphemes" and their description. Morphemes: are simply a convenient classification of heard phoneme sequences. Morphemes could be regarded as intermediate stages in a process of reconstruction of K under conditions of phoneme succession. This reconstruction (reproduction) is purely formal, without consideration of semantics. But the problem of the grammarian is quite different: it is based on a presupposed concept of a meaningful string or a normal utterance. Problem: we cannot say what the grammarian is trying to do, nor what his success or failure is. VII (c) 55 Morpheme/Quine: we oversimplified it when we treated it merely as convenient phoneme sequences. It is unrealistic because it requires the grammarian to use the vocabulary instead of allowing open categories. On the other hand, if we allow open morpheme categories, class K of meaningful strings ceases to be a formal construction of phonemes. ((s) Because the elements are not defined or blurred.) Then we can only say that it is a formal reconstruction of phonemes and their open morpheme categories. This open morpheme category cannot be characterized so simply; enumeration is no longer enough. An unanalyzed semantic element could penetrate this gap. X 42 Morpheme/Quine: is often regarded as the smallest meaning-bearing unit. N.B.: this would make the term language transcendent. However, morphemes are immanent in the language. Vs: Problem: According to what criterion could one consider shorter phoneme sequences as sentences or even longer sequences as meaning-bearing with speech-transcendent morphemes? Problem: the concept of meaning is too unclear to give a definition of the morpheme. But we do not need a transcendental definition. How to divide a phoneme sequence into words or morphemes is a mere question of expediency and simplicity in the context of a recursive determination of the consequences belonging to the class of language. It is simply a question of what you define as an element at the beginning and what you build up through educational rules. Lexicon/Grammar/Quine: this term is also immanent, because it contains the words or morphemes that belong to categories. >Lexicon/Quine, >Grammar/Quine, >Meaning/Quine.}, note = { Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=249706} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=249706} }