@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Wittgenstein,Ludwig}, subject = {Possibility}, note = {II 31 Possibility/Wittgenstein: we must not say: "A sentence p is possible." If p was not possible, it would not even be a sentence. II 139 Possibility/Novelty/News/Wittgenstein: we discover new facts, not new possibilities. There is no point asking if red exists. >Existence, >Existence statements, >Facts, >Sense. II 167/168 Possibility/Necessity/Realism/Idealism/Wittgenstein: in the arguments of idealists and realists the words "can", "cannot" and "must" always appear somewhere. However, no attempt is made to prove their theories through experience. >Experience, >Necessity. The words "possibility" and "necessity" express a piece of grammar, but they are formed according to the pattern of "physical possibility". II 228 Possibility/Wittgenstein: we tend to see a possibility as something that exists in nature. "This is possible" here, the real is a certain picture. >Picture. II 229 For example, "it is potentially present" gives the impression that we have given an explanation that goes beyond the possibility. But in reality, we have only replaced one expression with another. II 235 Possible/impossible/possibility/meaning/Wittgenstein: this is in a certain sense arbitrary. We say nobody sits in that chair, but someone could be sitting there. That means: the sentence "someone sits on this chair" makes sense. II 359 Possibility/Wittgenstein: by this we mean logically possible. Where can we look for the phenomenon of possibility? What justifies a symbolism is its usefulness. >Logical possibility. II 362 Possibility/Assignment/Wittgenstein: the possibility of assignment itself seems to be a kind of assignment. - - - IV 19 Thinking/Possibility/Logic/Tractatus: 3.02 What is conceivable is also possible. 3,031 It was said: God could do anything, but nothing that would be contrary to the logical laws. For we could not say what an "illogical world" would look like. >Conceivability/Chalmers. IV 20 3.032 Something "contrary to logic" cannot be depicted, nor can a figure in geometry whose coordinates contradict the laws of space. IV 20 Tractatus: 3.13 the sentence includes everything that belongs to projection, but not what is projected. IV 21 So the possibility of the projected, not this itself. The sentence does not yet contain its meaning, but the possibility of expressing it. IV 81 Possibility/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.525 It is incorrect to reproduce the sentence "(Ex).fx" as "fx is possible". - Possibility: is expressed by the fact that a sentence makes sense. Impossibility: by the fact that the sentence is a contradiction. >Contradictions. - - - VI 113 Possibility/Wittgenstein/Schulte: everything that is possible at all is also legitimate. Example: Why is "Socrates is Plato" nonsense? Because we have not made an arbitrary determination, but not because the sign itself is illegitimate. >Use, >Convention.}, note = { W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=249281} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=249281} }