@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Armstrong,David M.}, subject = {Counterfactual Conditionals}, note = {III 46 Counterfactual Conditionals/Armstrong: law statements support counterfactual conditionals (not vice versa) - when the law statements are true, the counterfactual conditionals are true - findings of GF do not support any counterfactual condiditionals. E.g. If Proton P no proton but electron, then repelled by other electron E - Armstrong: but absurd: Counterfactual Conditionals: if P not a philosopher, but electron, then repelled by E - ArmstrongVs: possible worlds in which this is possible have perhaps different laws of physics. >Law statements, >Regularities. III 48 Regularities: Regularities do not support counterfactual conditionals: nevertheless: if by chance an a is selected (who actually is not in the room), he will be wearing a watch. - Just not, "If he were in the room, he would..." III 163ff Counterfactual conditionals: VsMeinong's swamp, VsPrecarious ontology. - - - Place II 64 Counterfactual conditionals/Place: are always negative: if ... had not happened". There is no empirical evidence. Universal counterfactual conditional: law statement: positive: if ... had happened... Here empirical evidence is possible that supports the truth of the universal counterfactual conditional.}, note = { Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=239206} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=239206} }