@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Armstrong,David M.}, subject = {Categoricalness}, note = {Place I 22 Categorical/Place: only sentences can be categorical, not entities. Martin: "purely categorical": only the existence of the bearer of properties - and spatio-temporal relations between its parts. PlaceVsArmtrong: then microstructure is not "purely categorical" but only it's existence, and not the existence of the parts (the "structure").}, note = { Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=237208} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=237208} }