@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Logic Texts}, subject = {Subjunctive Conditionals}, note = {Read III 86f Subjunctive conditionals/counterfactual conditionals/Read: e.g. assuming the pound is devalued, but the recession still continues. >Counterfactual conditional. Is this sufficient to confirm the claim that the recession will continue when the pound is not devalued? This should be the case according to the truth-functional representation. But the conditional sentence suggests a closer connection between the front and rear links. But we now see that such a connection may not exist at all. Therefore, there is doubt as to whether the truth-functional representation is correct. >Truth-functional semantics. III 94 Conditional sentences are not truth-functional. >Conditional. III 108 ff E.g. by David Lewis: If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would be Italian and If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would not be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: Both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth-functional). The indicative sentences would be quite acceptable in the mouths of those whose nationality is unknown. Besides, there is no most similar world here. >Similarity metrics, >Bizet-Verdi case. III 109 Stalnaker: Sstalnakers's semantics installs a different assumption, namely, that there is always at least one most similar world. >Possible world/Stalnaker.}, note = { Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=236145} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=236145} }