@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Logic Texts},
subject = {Subjunctive Conditionals},
note = {Read III 86f
Subjunctive conditionals/counterfactual conditionals/Read: e.g. assuming the pound is devalued, but the recession still continues.
>Counterfactual conditional.
Is this sufficient to confirm the claim that the recession will continue when the pound is not devalued? This should be the case according to the truth-functional representation.
But the conditional sentence suggests a closer connection between the front and rear links. But we now see that such a connection may not exist at all.
Therefore, there is doubt as to whether the truth-functional representation is correct.
>Truth-functional semantics.
III 94
Conditional sentences are not truth-functional.
>Conditional.
III 108 ff
E.g. by David Lewis:
If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would be Italian
and
If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would not be Italian.
Stalnaker: one or the other must be true.
Lewis: Both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth-functional). The indicative sentences would be quite acceptable in the mouths of those whose nationality is unknown. Besides, there is no most similar world here.
>Similarity metrics, >Bizet-Verdi case.
III 109
Stalnaker: Sstalnakers's semantics installs a different assumption, namely, that there is always at least one most similar world.
>Possible world/Stalnaker.},
note = {
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 },
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=236145}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=236145}
}