@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Simons,Peter M.}, subject = {Identity}, note = {Chisholm II 171 Identity/Simons: thesis: differentiated objects may well have all parts in common: e.g. I and my body (ChisholmVs). >Parts, >Part-of-relation. --- Simons I 113 Identity/individual/whole/part/whole/extensional mereology/RescherVsExtensionality: (Rescher 1955): the extensional property that involves that wholes are identical if they have the same parts, excludes those part-whole relations, in which the organization ((s) internal structure) is involved, e.g. different sentences can consist of the same sentences, e.g. two "I's", and must not be identical if they have the same parts. E.g. a building committee equals a personnel committee, e.g. family Robinso equals the basketball team Robinson, e.g. a person/its body. N.B.: this is not about relations among themselves. >Mereology.}, note = { Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=231067} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=231067} }