@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Fodor,Jerry},
subject = {Holism},
note = {IV 41/42
Holism/science/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: if the network metaphor is correct, then there is nothing transtheoretical.
Vs: but this is needed for the public nature of the observation.
IV 49
Conceptual holism/Fodor/Lepore: assumptions about the necessary relationships between concepts have no psychological consequences, e.g. cat/animal requires nothing for the actual use or for learning (VsConceptual Holism). >Semantic holism.
IV 127f
Holism/Fodor/Lepore: a functional analysis of the belief can make it holistic but that does not imply conceptual holism, because belief is not a basic concept, but a representation. Thesis: belief holism is secured, conceptual holism is not!
IV 129/130
Holism/Fodor/Lepore: intentionality: does not lead to holism (propositional attitudes are not holistic qua intentionality, their semantic properties depend on things which only God knows). Functionalism: leads to holism. >Intentionality.
Fodor/LeporeVs: no, because there is no analytic-synthetic distinction. >Analyticity/syntheticity.
IV 179
Inferential role/Fodor/Lepore: originally, the attractiveness of the inferenctial role as a causal role consisted in providing a basis for the solution of Brentano's problem of irreducibility to neurophysiology. (>Computation).
IV 180
Fodor/Lepore: either one represents the semantics of the conceptual role or one is a holist. >Conceptual role semantics.},
note = { F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
},
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url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=229685}
}