@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Kripke,Saul A.}, subject = {Object}, note = {I 130 Queen Example: an object with another origin is not the same object. Kripke: it seems to me that every item that has a different origin is not that item. Cf. >Causal theory of knowledge, >Causal theory of reference, >Causal theory of names. I 131 For example, this table could be made of a completely different wood, or even ice. Question: can we imagine that this table was not made of wood? No, it seems to me that we can only imagine it as another table that is similar in all its exterior details. (The vagueness of the concept of a piece of matter raises some problems.) Principle A: Origin is essential. Principle B: Substance is essential. I 132 (footnote) There are various complications here. The temporal question is not to be confused with the timeless question of properties, nor the timeless question of what properties the object could have had. The question of whether the table could have turned into ice is irrelevant here. What matters is whether it could have originally been made of other wood. We usually ask here whether the universe could have developed differently from a certain point in time. For example, I could have been deformed if the fertilized egg, from which I did not originate, had been damaged, even though I did not exist at that time. Kripke: I do not want to say that only the origin and substance are essential. Properties: the piece of wood from which the table was made could have been processed into a vase instead, in which case the table would never have existed. So "to be a table" seems to be an essential feature of the table. Even if the question of whether an item really has a property has been decided, the question of whether this property is essential for the item may be vague.}, note = { Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=224707} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=224707} }