@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Searle,John R.}, subject = {Functions}, note = {I 266 Function/Searle: a function has no separate layer. E.g. the heart has no function, which would be added to its causal relations. Brain: by elimination of the level of the deep unconscious, the "physical causation" dissolves into nothing. >Functionalism, >Functional explanation. I 267 The normative component is in the eye of the beholder. The connection of mental content does not need to have a mental content itself (e.g. delusions). >Content, >Empirical content, >Observation, >Deception. - - - III 24 Function/Searle: a function always precedes the object: we do not perceive a table simply as an object. (Cf. objet ambigu, Paul Valéry). But nature does not know of functions. III 25 It is nature immanent, that the heart pumps blood, but immanent is the flow, merely attributed to the function. The function only exists in a system of previous value allocations - there, no other facts are detected than causal facts. III 26 Larry Wright: if Z is the function of X, then 1. there is X, because there is Z, 2. Z is a consequence of that there is X. SearleVs: that would eliminate the observer relativity of the function. III 27 Function/SearleVsMillikan: functions are always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent). Millikan: functions arose evolutionary. >Evolution/Millikan. SearleVs: so we can introduce everything and call it relevant. This does not explain the normative component of functions. Old dilemma: there are either only raw causal relations or real "functional" functions. III 50 Animals can assign functions to objects. >Animal.}, note = { Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=223072} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=223072} }