@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 19 Mar 2024},
author = {Wiggins,David},
subject = {Existential Generalization},
note = {II 302
Existential Generalization/Wiggins: Modal logic Vs Existential generalization:
E.g. "Cicero is necessarily a human being" as "N Cicero is a human".
If we do not differentiate de re and de dicto here, then
(Human(Cicero)) l- English (Ex)(Human x).
(Notation: I- = provable).
Because Cicero is a name with secured sense.
Problem: if Cicero is a human, then there are humans. - That is, the context "---" must apply to any possible world (which is wrong).
>Possible worlds, >Modal logic.
Then there is something that is necessarily a human
N((x)[(x = Cicero)>(x is a human)])
does not help, if the reason is the secured reference of the name, then the existence follows from the English meaning of the sentence (which is undesirable).
>Reference, >Existence.
Solution/Wiggins: we should distinguish de re/de dicto from the reach of "necessary" itself.
>de re, >de dicto, >Necessity.
II 303
Existential Generalization/EGWiggins: EG is ok for well-defined names - Existential generalization does not apply in any context of the form
N (---a---)
except for numbers.
>Numbers, >Names.},
note = { Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=219865}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=219865}
}