@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Fodor,Jerry},
subject = {Evolution},
note = {IV 145
Evolution Theory/Dennett/Fodor/Lepore: Dennett sees evolution theory as an "element of interpretation".
Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: but Dennett should not see something as a means of survival that you do not have.
DretskeVsDennett/MillikanVsDennett: that is why most evolutionists are realists in terms of content.
IV 146
Irrationality/belief/evolution/rationality/Dennett: thesis: we must not describe irrational mutations as a system of belief. A belief system that believes something wrong is a conceptual impossibility. Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: the theory of evolution can hardly act as the guarantor for the principle of truth.
IV 149
Theory of Evolution/truth/Fodor/Lepore: if you use the theory of evolution to explain intentional attribution, it is rather an empirical than a conceptual question whether the principle of truth applies or not, but we do not agree with the antecedent anyway.},
note = { F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=219362}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=219362}
}