@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Kripke,Saul A.}, subject = {Essentialism}, note = {III 375 Necessary de re (Quine: = "essentialism") is incomprehensible. Other authors: de re must be reduced to de dicto (also belief de re). >de re, >de dicto/Kripke, >Belief de re, >Essence/Kripke. - - - Kripke II 215 De re/essentialism/Kripke: e.g. a claim de re is the claim that the real number of planets (nine) necessarily has the property of being odd. >Planets example. Kripke: essentialists like I am think this is true (KripkeVsQuine). Also: when we say for example "Jones believes that the richest debutante in Dubuque will marry him" we mean that Jones' opinion has a certain content, namely that the richest debutante will actually marry him. >Content/Kripke. De dicto/Kripke: (example): here we believe of a girl who is (in fact) the richest in Dubuque and of whom Jones believes that she will marry him.}, note = { Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=218935} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=218935} }