@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Sellars,Wilfrid}, subject = {Appearance}, note = {I 24 Sellars: thesis: seeming prima facie = to be. I 26 Seeming/Appearance/Tradition: Being is more basal than seeming. Seeming is not a relationship between a person, a thing and a property. Tradition: Sense data should explain seeming.> >Sense data theory. Sellars: this is unnecessary. Experience/Sellars thesis: "is green" and "seems to be green" are identical. Only the first one is affirmed. cf. Ryle: >Success word). Seeming to be green presupposes the concept of being green. Seeming/Sellars: is not a relationship at all. >Appearance, >Perception, >Belief, >Language use, >Predicate, >Property, >Seeing, >Experience, >Stimuli, >Relation. I 30 ff Experience/Experience History/Sellars: not the result of impressions, but of appearances. >Sensory impressions. Phenomena are conceptual (to resettle them in a rational relationship to beliefs). >Phenomena. Appearance: Evidence for the experience differs just as little as the experiences. I 32 Appearance: the concept of green translucence, the ability to recognize that something appears to be green, presupposes the concept of being green. >Concept/Sellars. I 36 Seeming/Appearing/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of the red-seeming. - We must distinguish between qualitative and existential appearance. >Dispositions. --- I 38 Seeming/appearing/being/Sellars: Problem: if it is asserted that physical objects cannot appear red without experiencing something that is red, the question of whether the redness that has this something is this redness that the physical object appears to have. Solution: a) on the basis of empirical generalization b) theory of perception which refers to "direct experience". - - - Brandom I 425 Appearance: Sellars: two uses of "seems" or "looks like": Generic "seems"-statements: E.g. the chicken seems to have a number of spots, but there is no specific number that it seems to have. E.g. there seem to be a lot of crumbs on the table. But it does not seem that 998 crumbs are on the table or 999. --- Rorty VI 147/48 Appearing/seeming/explanation/SellarsVsNagel: the "appearances" that need to be rescued by scientific explanation, in turn, are language-relative. What appears to someone dependends on how one normally speaks. >Thomas Nagel, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Language use, >Word meaning.}, note = { Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=218189} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=218189} }