@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Simons,Peter M.},
subject = {Events},
note = {I 129
Event/occurrents/Simons: events or processes are like continuants in time, but with temporal parts. No identity conditions can be specified. Continuants cannot be eliminated. Brutus-events cannot be seperated into individual events without reference to Brutus.
I 131
Event/part/mereology/Simons: spatially and temporally extended events may have parts that are neither purely temporal nor purely spatial, e.g. the part of the football match which is attributable to a single player.
Range/span/spn(e): a range or span is a spatiotemporal localization. "Being in": means within larger regions. "Covering": means covering exactly the part.
Def spread/spr[e]: a spread is an exact space.
Def spell/sp[e]: spell refers to an exact time. Atomic: if pan and spread = 0. Connected: two events are connected, if their span (consisting of span and spell) are topologically connected.
Def temporal part: the temporal part contains all simultaneously occurring parts of the event (analog spatial part).
Def phase: a phase has temporally related part.
Def disc: a disc is a phase with duration 0.
Def segment: a segment is a spatially related spatial part.
Def section: a section is a segment with expansion 0.
I 134
Sum/event/mereology/Simon: for sums of events, it is different than for sums of objects: if events are causally isolated, they cannot form a sum. However, they can be part of a wider whole (they may have an upper limit). Events do not satisfy the full mereology, but the weaker axioms.
I 182
Product/events/Simons: problem: the products can exist interrupted. E.g. two objects could alternate between overlapping and separateness, e.g. light spots on a screen, e.g. two bodies share at a time certain members, at others times not. Problem: in the latter case the same product may arise again, but with other elements.
>Interrupted Existence.
I 183
The change of products requires topological terms.
I 182
Coincidence/events: the lack of extensionality allows only one proof of coincidence instead of uniqueness.
I 281
Event/reduction/reductionism/Forbes/Simons: events are open to a reduction in such a way as continuants are not, therefore, it is questionable whether there are irreducible truths de re about events ((s) that cannot be traced back to anything else).
Essentialism: but as events are also real objects, there should also be essential truth about them.
Problem: they are specified by descriptions. Simons: thesis: pro essentialism for events: e.g. the assassination of Franz Ferdinand by principle contains both essentially. E.g. bomb instead of firearm: is a different murder but not with swapped bullets.
I 282
It is essential for an event that it is exactly part of those events, of which it is part at this point of time. Different: four-dimensionalism: it does not obey the essentialism.
I 305
Event/continuants/Simons: event a: here a formula like "a < b" is complete. Continuants: here we need additionally a time index (with quantification): "ž(Et)[a Continuants.},
note = { Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=217192}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=217192}
}