@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Sellars,Wilfrid}, subject = {Sensations}, note = {I XIIf Sensation/Sellars: is not passive. >Perception/Sellars, >Appearance/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars, >Sensory impressions/Sellars. I 9 Sensation/Sellars: can be acquired through learning (symbols). - Sensation is also factual knowledge. Conclusion (RyleVs) is irrelevant. - Sensation is neither epistemically nor physically. - It is not to be equated with thoughts. >Facts/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Thoughts I 46 Sensation/Sellars: sensation is no idea. Learning: is activity. Experience: relates to an object. >Ideas, >Learning, >Experience/Sellars. I 77 Inner episodes: Ryle: Category error. >Terminology/Ryle. SellarsVsRyle: sensations as inner episodes are not an error but with other inner episodes (thoughts) intersubjectively explainable. >Intersubjectivity.}, note = { Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=215858} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=215858} }