@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Sellars,Wilfrid},
subject = {Sensations},
note = {I XIIf
Sensation/Sellars: is not passive.
>Perception/Sellars, >Appearance/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars, >Sensory impressions/Sellars.
I 9
Sensation/Sellars: can be acquired through learning (symbols). - Sensation is also factual knowledge.
Conclusion (RyleVs) is irrelevant. - Sensation is neither epistemically nor physically. - It is not to be equated with thoughts.
>Facts/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Thoughts
I 46
Sensation/Sellars: sensation is no idea.
Learning: is activity.
Experience: relates to an object.
>Ideas, >Learning, >Experience/Sellars.
I 77
Inner episodes: Ryle: Category error.
>Terminology/Ryle.
SellarsVsRyle: sensations as inner episodes are not an error but with other inner episodes (thoughts) intersubjectively explainable.
>Intersubjectivity.},
note = { Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977
},
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url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=215858}
}