@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Searle,John R.}, subject = {Consciousness}, note = {I 103 Consciousness/Block: a >zombie can have >consciousness. SearleVs: states of consciousness always have content but the "of" is not always one of intentionality: e.g. not in case of pain, because it is not outside. I 112 Consciousness does not need to be naturalized, it is completely natural. I 124f Consciousness/McGinn: consciousness is a kind of substance. The substance itself is recognized by >introspection but we cannot recognize the connection in principle. SearleVsMcGinn: 1) Consciousness is not a substance, but a feature of the brain. 2) Consciousness is not recognized by introspection. I 149 Space/time/consciousness: asymmetry: consciousness is temporal, but not spatial (Kant, Searle). >Time, >Timeless, >Space. I 153f Conditions of satisfaction/Searle: properties of the objects are >fulfillment conditions of my experiences and they are therefore difficult to distinguish from the property of the experiences (these always in perspective). Consciousness reflects the fulfillment conditions. Consciousness is not always intentional: e.g. depression. I 168 ff Consciousness/Searle: consciousness has nothing to do with incorrigibility and introspection. Self-deception requires Cartesian dualism. >Incorrigibility, >Introspection, >Dualism, >Cartesianism. I 198 ff Background: in the background there are skills and abilities that allow the consciousness to function (e.g. understanding pictures (uphill/downhill?). The same real meaning determines different fulfillment conditions in different backgrounds. Background: the background itself is not intention, "to be assumed" is not explicit propositional content and not explicit belief (objects are fixed). Network: additional knowledge cannot interpret itself, a network is intentional and no ability (even during sleep) ("Bush is Predsident").}, note = { Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=208642} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=208642} }