@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Geach,Peter}, subject = {Designation}, note = {I 52 Naming/Denotation/Two-Names Theory/GeachVsAristoteles: Incorrect approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names : "on the mat". >Naming, >Predication, >Attribution, >Names, >Predicates, >Aristotle. ((s) "The man stabbing Caesar to death stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus.") Geach: Additionally, Geach would use a link. Two-names theory/Aristotle/Geach: "Socrates is a philosopher" should be true because the thing is named. GeachVs: "Philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or every) philosopher". >General terms. --- I 153f Intentionality/naming/Parmenides/Geach: one cannot name anything that does not exist. (Geach pro) - ((s) Existence introduction is not arbitrary, not without premise). >Existence, >Existence statement, >Existence/Parmenides, >Introduction, >Nonexistence, >Fiction. E.g. Geach dreamed of a girl and wants to call it "Pauline". - On the other hand, acquaintance is sufficient - presence is not necessary. Problem: is the girl even more imaginary, if he has not dreamed of her? Geach: that is a sure sign that this is all nonsense. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. Geach with Parmenides: "There is only that what exists." GeachVsParmenides: However, one can talk about non-existent objects. - E.g. talking about absent friends without knowing that he is dead, changes the truth value, but not the fact that these are sentences. >Truth value, >Reference. Imaginary girls are not competing for identification in the dream. - If it is true of no identifiable girl that I dreamed of her, then I have not dreamed of any girl. >de re, >de dicto, >Identification. Solution: "I dreamed of a girl, but it is not true of a certain girl that I dreamed of her". - This is similar to: it is not true of a certain stamp that I want it. --- I 252 Predication/Geach: predication can be done without naming: in an if-that-sentence or in an or-sentence, a term P can be predicated of a thing without naming the thing "P". E.g. "If that what the policeman said is true, then he drove faster than 60". This does not call the policeman's sentence true. - (> Conditional). Predication/naming: centuries-old error: that the predicate is uttered by the thing. Frege: Difference >naming / >predication, >designation: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicted in a non-assertive sub-clause (subset). Therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa. >Naming.}, note = { Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=206712} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=206712} }