@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Davidson,Donald}, subject = {Conceptual Schemes}, note = {I (c) 41/42 Third Dogma/Conceptual Scheme/DavidsonVsQuine: Scheme: Language along with ontology and world theory - Contents: build exemplary firing of the neurons. - (in Quine instead of sense data) - QuineVsDavidson: Separation is not intended, it only appears in Davidson's presentation like this - The concept of the uninterpretable content is necessary, however, to make conceptual relativism clear. Conceptual relativism: The conceptual scheme is a human creation; it is arbitrary. - "Conceptual sovereignty". I (c) 44 DavidsonVsQuine: There are no last data, therefore no subtraction. I (e) 87ff Conceptual Scheme/Separation Scheme/Content >relativism - "stream of experience" - "uninterpreted givenness" - conceptual relativism. - - - I (e) 96 Scheme/Contents: Both have come into play as a pair, (Cl. Lewis) now we can let them drop out as pair. - Then no objects remain, in terms of which the question of representation could be raised - beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing. >Representation/Davidson. I (e) 98 Third Dogma/Scheme/Content/Error/Deception/Davidson: Deception is no longer a problem after the abolition of the separation scheme/content, no matter whether we are capable of knowing the world and other minds. - All the more: how - but these are no epistemological questions anymore now, but questions of the nature of rationality. - - - Glüer II 133 Incommensuralibilty presumes the separation scheme/content (Third Dogma).}, note = { Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=205591} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=205591} }