1.1 83 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Authors/Titles Dennett 1 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Intentions Dennett II 39f<br /> Intention/action/life/Evolution/Dennett: modes of action within such primitive systems (macromolecules) are similar to intentional actions. The systems are driven by information and strive for goals.<br /> Thermometers are similar "pseudo-agents"! They are "intentional systems". <br /> In order to understand them we should take the "intentional position" against them. <br /> II 57<br /> Purpose/intention/meaning/action/Dennett: the goal of expressing exactly how the actor sees his task is erroneous, a pointless exercise, like reading poems under the microscope. 2 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Abstractness Dennett I 497 f<br /> Abstraction/explanation/Dennett: Dan Sperber: you must not proceed too abstract intentionally. Abstract objects do not enter directly into the causal relationships.<br /> E.g. the excitement of a child is not caused by the abstract story of Journey to the Moon, but by the fact that it understands its mother s words .<br /> Dennett: this is no obstacle for science, on the contrary: they can cut the Gordian knot of tangled causal relationships by using an abstract formulation and ignoring all those complications. (Intentional point of view). <br /> I 498<br /> E.g. The excitement of the child does not result from the abstract story, but from the understanding of the words of its mother. 3 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Similarity Dennett 4 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Actualism Dennett I 143<br /> Actualism/Dennett: only that what is real is possible - Histdict: Mind can only be regarded as an activity, not as a substance.<br /> I 163<br /> Determinism/Actualism/Dennett: some authors: if determinism is correct, actualism must also be right. Or the other way aroun. If actualism is wrong, indeterminism would have to be right - DennettVs: this is wrong! E.g. This oxygen atom can combine with two hydrogen atoms. So something is possible which is not real now, therefore determinism is wrong - DennettVsActualism: it is wrong, regardless of the truth or falsity of determinism.<br /> I 249<br /> Actualism/DennettVsNietzsche: he did not believe in any variants, but in exact repetition - therefore he was a follower of actualism. 5 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Generality Dennett I 691<br /> Generality/particularity/AI/Dennett: Donald Symons: there is no " general problem solver" , because there is no general problems, only particular problems - DennettVsSymons: There is no general wound but only particular wounds - but there is a general wound healing process 6 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML As if Dennett I 555<br /> As-if-Intentionality/Searle: e.g. Computers - DennettVs: can be genuine intentionality - AI: we are composed of machines - Darwinism / Dennett: we descended from vending machines (macromolecules). 7 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Anthropic Principle Dennett I 225<br /> Anthropic principle/Freeman Dyson (Author): "I am not saying the structure of the universe proves the existence of God, but He is compatible with the hypothesis that the spirit plays a crucial role for its functioning<br /> I 227<br /> Anthropic principle/Dennett: in its "weak form" it is harmless, occasionally useful application of elementary logic: if x is a necessary condition for the existence of y, and if y exists, then x exists as well. (> Salmon)<br /> DennettVsAnthropic principle: "Strong Form": false use of "must": "If physical structures depend on larger molecules, then they must exist, because we exist.<br /> Correct instead: It must be the case that: if consciousness depends on ..., then there are such elements in the world, because we have a consciousness.<br /> The conclusion to which one is entitled only says that there are such elements, not that there have to be. 8 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Species Dennett I 56<br /> Kind / Dennett: question: do individuals belong to different kinds if they can not cross, or if they just don t do it? 9 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Meaning Dennett I 565<br /> Example Vending Machine: Thesis: The environment creates meaning / function / evolution / Dennett: the importance is how the function at the moment of their creation is still nothing definite! Example accepted zoo of fregs exclusively with flying dummies, but adequate replacement diet for Frogs: What do the eyes tell the brain then? <br /> I 281<br /> Meaning / Dennett: origins, birth of meaning: thesis: the nucleotide sequences, initially purely syntactically, take "semantics" - that "quasi-importance": e.g. mode of action of macromolecules - SearleVsDennett: just as-if intentionality - DennetVsSearle: ewe must start somewher - the first steps are not to be seen as steps towards significance - 282 I also parts that have only half-intentionality belong to us.<br /> <br /> Brandom I ~ 110<br /> Meaning / Dennett: that something is a piece of copper means nothing else than that it is appropriate to treat it as such. 10 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Concepts Dennett II 13<br /> Criteria / recognition / Dennett: e.g. an animal is confused. Question: "what is the conceptual content of his being confused?" 11 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Evidence Dennett I 244<br /> Evidence/Dennett: E.g. assuming there is someone who promises to give magical powers in the competition of coin toss. Those who were cheated meet, and there is certainly a winner. He will then have evidence that there are supernatural forces.<br /> I 424<br /> Coincidence/Evidence/Dennett: e.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of randomness. <br /> Context: abruptness of the Cambrian evolution. 12 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Consciousness Dennett Rorty VI 161<br /> Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception.<br /> --- <br /> Dennett I 534<br /> Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today. <br /> ---<br /> Dennett II 23ff<br /> Language/animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question of which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought without language but consciousness without thinking.<br /> --- <br /> Metzinger/Rosenthal II 430<br /> Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what is conscious and what is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory!<br /> ---<br /> Metzinger II 475<br /> Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world - it relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer.<br /> ---<br /> Metzinger II 555<br /> Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of P-B and Z-B. (phenenmenal conscious and access-conscious).<br /> ---<br /> Chalmers I 113<br /> Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,...<br /> ---<br /> I 114<br /> ...control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language.<br /> ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.<br /> Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".<br /> ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.<br /> Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)<br /> Cognitive Models/Chalmers: these models also exist by Churchland (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all, my criticism VsDennett from above applies.<br /> ---<br /> Chalmers I, 229<br /> Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b) Consciousness is what stands out in brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929).<br /> Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role. 13 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Darwinism Dennett I 262<br /> The rule of the Local is a basic principle of Darwinism - it corresponds to the principle that there is no Creator, no intelligent foresight. 14 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Thinking Dennett II 58<br /> Thinking/Animal/Dennett: can dogs think? Problem: An idea must be composed of certain concepts.<br /> Question of the description or formulation: E.g. bowl with meat, bucket with feed, "the delicious stuff that tastes so and so" ... <br /> Translation: Could we, for example, just express the exact thought the dog thinks in German? If not, dogs can either not think at all or their thoughts cannot be expressed, and thus lie beyond our horizon.<br /> II 157<br /> Thinking/Speech/Dennett: All in all, these considerations suggest that our way of thinking had to wait for speech to develop. <br /> Speech, in turn, had to wait for keeping of secrets to develop, and that in turn required the development of a certain complexity of the environment.<br /> II 202<br /> DennettVsRyle: notorious are his assertions that thinking could only take place in the public world and would not need to occur in a personal place. <br /> II 190<br /> Speech/Thinking/Dennett: no thinking without speech - (Thinking is not the same as consciousness (see above) E.g. dog has no concept of cat as an animal). 15 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Forms of Thinking Dennett I 275<br /> Border/Unger: there must always be a pair of x on both sides of the border; this is required by our conventions. <br /> InwagenVsUnger: so much the worse for the conventions!<br /> Jackendoff: Candidates on the border are forced into one or the other category.<br /> Dennett: a good trick, but no forced move! Darwin shows us that nature does not need what we say we need to think; nature copes well with gradual variations. <br /> I 277 <br /> ((s) Limits necessary for thinking, but not for nature.)<br /> General/Particular/AI/Dennett: Donald Symons: there is no " general problem solver", because there are no general problems, only particular problems. <br /> I 691<br /> DennettVsSymons: There is also no general wound, but only particular wounds. Nevertheless, there is a general wound healing process. 16 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Properties Dennett I 68f<br /> Properties/Competition/Evolution/Dennett: E.g. competition in coin toss produces some kind of winner. However, this winner is not the carrier of any historical properties that would have predestined him to be the winner, like it happens in a tennis tournament.<br /> In a repetition hardly the same person would win. <br /> I 131<br /> Coincidence/Dennett: coincidence has no memory. (E.g. competition in coin toss favors no properties of the winner).<br /> Properties/"Eve"/Human origin/Dennett: except for the fact that she had two daughters, there is nothing special about Eve! She was certainly not the first human woman and not harder working than her contemporaries. (> Competition, coin toss). <br /> I 295<br /> She can only be identified afterwards.<br /> Properties/Evolution "why" questions/Dennett: E.g. 99 per cent of all living creatures that have ever lived have died without offspring, but non of our ancestors belonged to them. In our family tree we find ancestors with strengths and weaknesses, but none of these weaknesses led to extinction. So it might seem as though the evolution cannot explain even one property that we have inherited from our ancestors.> Explanation. <br /> I 382<br /> Properties/Dennett: does the world of the living have many properties that are there for no reason? That depends on what you consider to be a property.<br /> Exthe fact that an elephant has more legs than eyes is not an adaptation and no adaptationist would assert that. <br /> I 607<br /> Properties/Dennett: E.g. The Sword in the Stone that only Arthur can pull out: invisible property that only shows itself in the situation. 17 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Sensations Dennett 18 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Experience Dennett II 60<br /> Perception/Creatures/Dennett: Many organisms "learn" the sun: E.g. sunflower align themselves with her.<br /> But only we humans make the ontological experience: Every day it is the same sun. 19 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Explanation Dennett Rorty VI 144<br /> Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological - that is why it seems to be the case that there is a difference between thinking that something seems to be pink, and that something really seems to be pink. <br /> I 137<br /> Explanation/Model/Dennett: Models must be neither too difficult nor oversimplified. E.g. it is not about following all the electrons in a calculator.<br /> Model/pattern/explanation/Dennett: why are we considering this model and not a different one? In order to justify that we must not only take the real into consideration but also the possible. <br /> I 335<br /> We need to develop an idealization of degrees of possibility.<br /> Explaining evolution: > Properties: E.g. you ordered a green car and it comes on time: the question is not why this car is green, but: why is this (green) car here. ((s) consider the car as a whole, the green car would otherwise be elsewhere). > wrong question.<br /> Just-about-stories: E.g. Lake Victoria. Unusually many species of perch. Only (conventional) explanation: Too many ponds dried out. But besides the properties of the animals you have no evidence for that. <br /> I 416<br /> Dennett: all these stories are "too good to be true". But Gould does not adopt the Pangloss principle when he considers them to be true until the opposite is proven.<br /> Coincidence/evidence/Dennett: e.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of coincidence. <br /> I 424<br /> Cambrian Explosion/DennettVsGould: here again suddenness is no evidence of coincidence. <br /> I 102<br /> Explanation/justification/Evolution/Dennett: e.g. the advantages of sexuality cannot be taken as a reason for why they are there - the evolution cannot foresee its path - consequence: the sexuality must have survived as a side effect (epiphenomenon). 20 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML First Person Dennett Rosenthal II 430<br /> Consciousness / Dennett: even for the first person it is not always clear , what is conscious and what is not - Example to become aware of the inventory of a room- e.g. Wallpaper design: Completion by judgment, not by sensorium! - 21 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Ethics Dennett I 636<br /> Ethics/morality/Dennett: Question: did it also arise evolutionarily? One would expect that a very long time ago, there was no moral, but not more than a distinction between a good and a bad spear or a good or bad dinner. Not concepts of "right" and "wrong" but of dangerous and not dangerous. <br /> I 657<br /> Ethics/Dennett: must somehow be based on human nature. If this is naturalism, then there is no naturalistic erroneous conclusion. <br /> II ~ 199<br /> The terrible thing is not the suffering, but the event which caused it. 22 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Evolution Dennett I 101<br /> Evolution/Justification/Dennett: the advantages of sexuality cannot be taken as a justification. Evolution cannot foresee its path! Whatever it produces must pay off immediately and make up for the effort. <br /> I 213<br /> Problem: there must have been a first living creature, but there can t have been a first living creature. <br /> I 591ff<br /> E.g. freezing/Dennett: E.g. assuming you have yourself frozen in order to be unfrozen in the 25th century. Upon whom can you rely? The E.g. imitates the whole evolution. <br /> II 36<br /> Evolution/Dennett: There is only one family tree - it holds all creatures that have ever lived. 23 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Forgeries Dennett I 293<br /> Forgery/ Dennett: Fake Antiques: Drill a hole with a modern drill at a prominent place. The buyer then thinks no one is so stupid and drills a hole in such a prominent place. 24 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Forms Dennett I 268f<br /> Form / meaning / Dennett: in the world of macromolecules form is the same as determination. 25