1.1 22 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Authors/Titles Chomsky N. Chomsky<br /> I Chomsky Linguistik und Philosophie aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und Philosophie Frankfurt (Athen䵭) 1974/1995 1 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Innateness Chomsky Katz/Meggle II 380<br /> Innate ideas are the crux of the dispute between empiricists and rationalists. 2 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Simplicity Chomsky I 295<br /> Simplicity/Chomsky: mathematics has no concept of the "easiness" of a calculation - therefore one needs an optimal computational procedure.<br /> ---<br /> I 305 <br /> Chomsky refers to choice between grammars, not between theories - E of G would be empirically like a physical constant. 3 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Explanation Chomsky Strawson VI 392<br /> Explanation/Chomsky: admits that an "explanatory adequate" grammar does not have to be "descriptive-adequate" - we need a theory of linguistic universals and why our grammar was selected. 4 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Forms Chomsky I 310<br /> Chomsky: interested in whether there are ideas and principles which determine the form of the knowledge acquired (rationalist variant) or (Vs) whether the structure of the acquisition mechanism is limited to simple processing mechanisms (empiricist version) - Empiricism/Chomsky: is not that important. 5 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Grue Chomsky I 290<br /> Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: marginal problem - the initial question is much too vague - you can easily find a property of language "grue bleen" which is not a property of a "languange like German" - e.g. the predicate "being similar", only applied to objects rather than to quali 6 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Grammar Chomsky Searle VIII 414<br /> ChomskyVsStructuralism: phrase structure rules alone cannot resolve ambiguities - e.g. Active/Passive - Solution/Chomsky: transformation rules, transformation phrase markers by permutation, insertion, eradication of elements in other phrase markers - then the syntax consists of two components: base and transformation.<br /> ---<br /> VIII 418<br /> Deep structure/Chomsky: determines the meaning - Surface structure: determines the phonetic form (late works: sometimes the meaning) - Syntax/Chomsky: is to be separated from semantics - (according to Searle): man is a syntactic creature, the brain is syntactic.<br /> ---<br /> VIII 421 <br /> SearleVsChomsky: from this it would follow that if one day we had syntactically modified forms, we would have no language anymore, but something else.<br /> ---<br /> VIII 421<br /> Generative grammar/NeogrammariansVsChomsky: semantics crucial for the formation of syntactic structures. 7 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Ideas Chomsky Katz/Meggle II 380<br /> Innate ideas are the crux of the dispute between empiricists and rationalists. 8 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Competence Chomsky I 307<br /> Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: I do not claim that they consist in "knowing-that", that language is described by the rules of grammar - Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: not a number of habits, no reference to the ability of the cyclist - instead the mastery of generative grammar - (non-formulated knowledge) - less than the ability to speak a language.<br /> ---<br /> Searle VIII 404<br /> Competence/performance/Chomsky: Thesis: performance is just the peak of the iceberg of competence.<br /> ---<br /> VIII 437 <br /> SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is wrong: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more like a theory of performance than one of competence - he does not see that ultimately competence is a performance competence - ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: suspects behaviorism behind it. SearleVs: not true, because speech act theory involves intention.<br /> ---<br /> Searle VIII 409<br /> Chomsky: new: object of study is the language skills - old: random number of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not.<br /> --- <br /> VIII 414 <br /> SearleVsChomsky: not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker. 9 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Criteria Chomsky I 345<br /> Criteria/mental states/Wittgenstein: mental states or the "inner workings of the mind" do not provide a criterion for the proper use of an expression.<br /> ---<br /> I 346<br /> ChomskyVsWittgenstein: here it is not about a "real statement" e.g. if someone reads something, but about a legitimate claim - e.g. mirage: can provoke a legitimate (incorrect) assertion. 10 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Artificial Intelligence Chomsky Putnam III 29/30<br /> Artificial Intelligence/Chomsky: Chomsky believes that the computer model of the mind is right, but doubts the success of the artificial intelligence. 11 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Method Chomsky I 278<br /> Method/theory/Chomsky: requirement; we must be able to describe what the person receives - the percept itself is a construction of the first order - its properties are determined experiment. Grammar: construction of the second-order - for this one must abstract from the other factors involved in the use and understanding of language and refer to internalized knowledge of the speaker - VsBehaviorismus: excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and "what is learned" from the outset.<br /> ---<br /> I ~ 297ff<br /> Method/theory: PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered through routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not that impressive - ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact this refers to competence and not to performance - routine does not matter here, but the inherent correlation between sound and meaning.<br /> ---<br /> I 303 <br /> Chomsky: my universal grammar is not a "theory of language acquisition", but one element of it - my thesis is an "all-at-once" proposal and does not try to capture the interplay between the tentative hypotheses constructed by the child and new data interpreted with them.<br /> ---<br /> I 316<br /> Method/theory/Chomsky: "association", "reinforcement", "random mutation ": hide our ignorance - (s) something dissimilar may also be associated.<br /> ---<br /> I 321<br /> Method/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty - if reinforcement is needed for learning, it means that learning cannot happen without data.<br /> ---<br /> I 323 <br /> Language Learning/ChomskyVsQuine: he does not explain it: if only association and conditioning, then the result is merely a finite language.<br /> ---<br /> I 324 <br /> VsQuine: concept of probability of a sentence is empty: the fact that I utter a particular German sentence is as unlikely as a particular Japanese sentence from me. 12 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Surface Structure Chomsky I 269F <br /> Surface Structure/Chomsky: finding a hierarchy of phrases that belong to certain categories: noun phrase, verb phrase, adjective phrase, etc. E.g. John is certain Bill wants to leave - John is certain to leave: similar surface structure, different deep structure. <br /> ---<br /> I 273 <br /> Surface Structure/Chomsky: Assumption: it contributes nothing to the meaning - what contribution a term makes to the sentence, is adjusted by the deep structure (> compositionality) - ChomskyVsAnalytic Philosophy: if different intensions after substitution should change the meaning, there would have to be a corresponding difference in the deep structure, which is unlikely. 13 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Semantics Chomsky I 272 <br /> Semantics/Chomsky: here the surface structures hardly help, the deep structure helps even more. <br /> --- <br /> Strawson V 393 <br /> StrawsonVsChomsky: hardly deals with semantics - its lexicon contains much fewer entries than our dictionaries. 14 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Language Chomsky 15 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Language Acquisition Chomsky I 281<br /> Learning/Chomsky: a child learns as well Japanese as English - pointless to ask "which hypotheses it reduces" - there must be more than the ability to associate - structural grammar does not yield the structures that we have to postulate as generative grammar.<br /> ---<br /> I 283 <br /> Internal organization plays an important role for the perception, it determines an extremely restrictive initial scheme.<br /> ---<br /> I VsGoodman 285<br /> Learning a second language is not that different.<br /> ---<br /> I 299<br /> Learning/Chomsky: whether the evaluation function is learned or it is the basis for learning, is an empirical question.<br /> ---<br /> I 324<br /> Language learning: behaviorist/Quine: Conditioning, association - ChomskyVsQuine: additionally principles , only by them infinitely many sentenes are explainable. 16 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Synonymy Chomsky I 335 <br /> Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: false idealization: not "equality in the terms" causes synonymous expressions - not assertibility conditions (circumstances) but it is about distinguishing between langue and parole, between competence and performance. 17 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Deep Structure Chomsky I 269F<br /> Surface Structure/Chomsky: Determination of a hierarchy of parts of sentences that belong to specific categories: noun phrase, verb phrase, adjective phrase, etc. E.g. John is certain that Bill will leave. John is certain to leave: - similar surface structure, different deep structure.<br /> ---<br /> I 273<br /> Surface Structure/Chomsky: Assumption: it contributes nothing to the meaning. The contribution an expression makes to the sentence is defined by the deep structure (> compositionality) ChomskyVsAnalytic Philosophy: if different intensions were to change their meaning after substitution, there would have to be a corresponding difference in the deep structure, which is unlikely.<br /> ---<br /> I 276f<br /> Deep Structure/Chomsky: plays a role in the mental representation of sentences. 18 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Transformational Grammar Chomsky I 271<br /> Chomsky: thesis: in any language, surface structures are produced by "grammatical transformation" from "deep structures" - Definition transformation: Representation of an indexed bracket on an indexed bracket, e.g. [S[NPJohn][VP is [AP Certain] [VP ...] - deep structure: even an indexed bracket - the large class of deep structure is specified by basic rules - deep structure: subject and predicate may be exchanged - deep structures are limited in their variance.<br /> ---<br /> I 296<br /> Transformation/Grammar/ChomskyVsPutnam: Transformations are not rules but operations - (for creating surface structures from deep structures).<br /> ---<br /> Strawson VI 395<br /> Transformational grammar Vs traditional grammar: it is supposed to be too unsystematic, no explanation with the traditional concepts "verb" , "noun", "object" is possible - transformational grammer Vs formal logic.<br /> ---<br /> 397 VI <br /> Grammar/Strawson: must distinguish between essential and non-essential connections. 19 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Indeterminacy Chomsky I 325 <br /> Indeterminacy of translation/Quine/Chomsky: According to this theory all the suggestions for the translation should be able to be "compatible with the totality of speech disposition, but incompatible with each other." (Q + O, 27) - Chomsky: that is not possible because of the problems associated with the probability. The thesis when all probabilities are indistinguishable, both inside and outside of a language - Quine: circumvents the problem by starting not from the "totality of dispositions" but from the "stimulus meaning".<br /> --- <br /> I 325 <br /> Translation ambiguity, vagueness: ChomskyVsQuine: Disposition either in terms of stimulus, or in relation to the total corpus of the language: then all sentences are equally likely - (reference classes). 20 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Underdetermination Chomsky I 337 <br /> Underdetermination/Indeterminacy/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine: each hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting. 21 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Truth Functions Chomsky 22