Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beliefs | Loar | Schiffer I 19 Belief/Loar: a belief is understood as a function that depicts propositions on internal physical states. >Brain/Brain state, >Mental states, >Physical/psychic, >Propositions, >Materialism. These internal physical states have functional roles that are specified by these propositions. >Functional role. Schiffer I 286f Belief/SchifferVsLoar: Problem: his realization of a theory of beliefs/desires (as a function of propositions on physical states), whose functional roles are defined by the theory. Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role rather than many roles. >Mapping. Schiffer: this will not work, therefore the Quine-Field argument is done in. Quine-Field Argument/Schiffer: . . . Schiffer I 109 Def Conceptual Role/Field: (Field 1977)(1): the subjectively induced conditional probability function of an actor. Two mental representations s1 and s2 have the same conceptual role for one person iff. their (the person's) subjective conditional probability function is such that for each mental representation s the subjective probability of s1 given s is the same as that of s2 given s. SchifferVs: that never happens. Field ditto - E.g. blind persons certainly have different conceptual roles of flounders - then there will be no correlation to the belief objects either. 1. Hartry Field (1977).Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role. Journal of Philosophy 74 (7):378-409 . . . Schiffer I 286f Belief/Beliefs/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine, beliefs are never true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. >Beliefs/Quine, >Intentionality/Brentano. But: QuineVsBrentano: ~ the canonical scheme includes no propositional attitudes, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms. >Propositional attitudes. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Folk Psychology | Schiffer | I 33f SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs simultaneously. >Functional role, >Belief. SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows #(that snow is = white Bel T #(that grass is green). Then both have the same T#-correlated functional role. (T* = folk psychology). >Meaning theory/Loar, cf. >Homophony. I 276 Here the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition. >Uniqueness condition. It is not sufficient for that one is in a particular belief state that is linked to them: - E.g. "If p is true, one believes that p". N.b. "p" exists inside and outside the belief context. Therefore, the theory will say something clear about p. Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. >Opaque context. I 34 All that does not distinguish the belief that dinosaurs are extinct from the fact that fleas are mortal. ((s) Related problem: equivalence in the disquotation scheme: "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green.) >Equivalence, >Disquotation scheme. Schiffer: Problem: there are not enough input rules that are not based on perception. I 38 BurgeVsFolk Psychology/BurgeVsIntention based semantics/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: famous example: Alfred believes in w that he has arthritis in his thigh. - But he also covers all proper cases. In w he has a correct use of "Arthrite". Then he has in w not the believe that he has arthrite in his thigh - (because this belief is false). N.b.: in w he is in exactly the same T*-correlated states (T* = folk psychology) as in w. Therefore, he would have to express the same belief. But he does not - hence the common sense functionalism must be false. >Functionalism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Functional Role | Schiffer | I 21 Functional Property/Schiffer: the concept of the functional property is derived from the notion of a functional role. Def functional role/Schiffer: simply any property 2nd order, of a state-type 2nd order. Its possession means that the possession of this state-type is causal or counterfactual to other state-types, namely, to output, input, distal objects and their properties. 1. A given physical state-type has an indeterminate number of functional roles. 2. Two different physical state-types may have the same functional role. Def functional property/Schiffer: each functional role uniquely determines a functional property-If F is an f role, then the functional property is expressed by the open sentence: x is a token of a state-type which has F. ((s) The functional property is a token of the physical state-type which has this and the role. In short: property = to be token of the type with the role.) Schiffer: Type here is always "physically"). >Type/Token. Properties belong to tokens - roles belong to types. E.g. the neural state-type H (hunger) has different functional roles in different people, because it is not triggered for all by pizza smell (various inputs.) >Input/output. I 23 Then you can correlate propositions with functional roles and a belief-property with a functional property. - For every proposition p, there is a functional role F so that a belief that p = to be a state token of the state-type that has the role F. >Propositions. I 26 The criterion that a state-token n is a belief that p that n is a token of a state-type which has the functional role, which is correlated with the definition of Bel T p. I 29 Verbs for propositional attitudes get their meaning through their functional role. ((s) e.g. "believes..."). >Propositional attitudes. I 30 Folk Psychology: 3 types of generalization: 1. functional roles for influencing beliefs among themselves 2. input conditions for perception (cannot be part of the common knowledge) 3. output conditions for actions. Problem: E.g. blind people can have our belief, but not our folk psychology. >Generalization. I 33f SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs (belief) simultaneously. >Folk psychology. SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows # (that snow is = Bel T#(that grass is green) - then both have the same T-correlated functional role. >Brian Loar. I 276 N.b.: although the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition. - It is not sufficient for: that one is in a particular belief-state that is linked to them: E.g. "if p is true, one believes that p." N.B.: "p" occurs inside and outside of the belief context - therefore, the theory will say something unique about p. Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. >Uniqueness condition. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. I 34 All that does not differentiate the belief that dinosaurs are extinct, from that, that fleas are mortal. ((s) Related problem: equivalence in the disquotation scheme: "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green.) >Equivalence, >Disquotation scheme. Problem: there is a lack of input: "rules that do not relate to perception". I 35 Twin Earth/SchifferVsFolk Psychology: folk psychology must be false because in the twin earth, a different belief has the same functional role. >Twin earth. E.g. Ralph believes there are cats - twin earth-Ralph believes - "there are cats" (but there are twin earth cats). Therefore twin earth-Ralph does not believe that there are cats - i.e. so two different beliefs but same functional role. Twin earth-Ralph is in the same neural state-type N - the specification of belief might require reference to cats, but the counterfactual nature of the condition would ensure that N is satisfied for twin earth-Ralph. N.B.: that does not follow from a truth about functional roles in general, but with respect to the theory T* (folk psychology). Outside the folk psychology: "every token of "cat" is triggered by the sight of a cat". Wrong solution: platitude: "typically triggered by cats". Thhis cannot be a necessary condition - in addition there are twin earth-examples, where typical belief is unreliable for one's own truth. VsDescription: no solution: "The thing in front of me". >Acquaintance. I 38 f Tyler Burge: no functional role can determine what one believes (this is not about the twin earth, but wrongly used terms). I 286f Belief/SchifferVsLoar: problem: his realization of a theory of belief/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states) whose functional roles are determined by the theory. Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role instead of a lot of roles. Schiffer: thesis: that will not work, therefore the Quine/Field argument is settled. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Knowledge how | Chalmers | Chalmers I 142 Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)(1) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)(2) Tye (1986)(3), Churchland (1985)(4), Papineau (1993)(5), Teller (1992)(6), McMullen (1985)(7): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors... I 143 ... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. >Color researcher Mary, >Qualia, >Knowledge, >Propositional Knowledge, >Experience, >Intentions, >Primary Intension, >Terminology/Chalmers. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)(8)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library). I 144 ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)(9): there is an ontological gap here. ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours. >Conceivability, >Possible worlds. 1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17 4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28 5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33 8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47 9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Knowledge how | Loar | Chalmers I 142 Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)(1) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)(2) Tye (1986)(3), Churchland (1985)(4), Papineau (1993)(5), Teller (1992)(6), McMullen (1985)(7): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors... I 143 ... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)(8)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library). I 144 ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)(9): there is an ontological gap here. ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours. 1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17 4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28 5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33 8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47 9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Meaning Postulates | Loar | Schiffer I 34 Meaning-restriction/solution/Loar: Proposal: (from Carnap’s meaning postulates, 1947(1)) - .E.g. if x believes that y is north of z and that u is north of y, then x believes that u north of z. Then the Meaning-restriction should join any propsition which does not exist in an input condition, with a proposition that occurs in a unique input condition. >Propositions. SchifferVsLoar: there are not enough Meaning-restrictions. SchifferVsFolk Psychology: it cannot guarantee functionalist reduction. >Folk psychology. 1. Rudolf Carnap (1947). Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Propositions | Loar | II 140 Proposition/Davidson: (meanings as entities) are not independent of descriptions: "The meaning of "Theaetetus flies". Problem: Relations between such descriptions cannot be specified in such a way that the compositionality can be shown. >Compositionality. LoarVsDavidson: instead: semantics of possible worlds. >Possible world semantics. II 147 Proposition/Loar: Problem: if the form of the words is irrelevant, the reference becomes doubtful - this happens when propositional attitudes are made a relation between speaker, sentence and an intentional entity. Solution/Frege: "that S" describes the meaning of "S" as an entity, but not S as "having a certain meaning". >Meaning/Frege. Even better solution: paratactic analysis/Davidson. >Paratactic analysis. Schiffer I 25f Loar/Schiffer: establishes a theory in which there are a pair of functions from propositions to internal states in which one is determined by the content of the theory. Propositions are then external indexes of the functional roles that you want to assign to physical states. So the propositions remained external to the system. Analogy: Physical Properties/Stalnaker: For example, having a certain height or weight. This can be seen as a relation between a thing and a number, because they belong to a family of properties that have a common structure with the real numbers. >Properties/Stalnaker. In this way one can also pick out propositions: as a relation between person and proposition. The theory then has a form where the quantified variables (the "φ-s") pass over functions that map propositions to physical Z-types. If the theory is true then these Z-types have the functional roles that determine the theory. (All this applies only with assumed relation theory, i.e. a relation to assumed objects of belief). >Relation theory, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. Schiffer I 45 Belief/Loar/Schiffer: Loar began with propositions. These later became superfluous. SchifferVsLoar: the theory is not completely general - only for normal adults. It is not immune to twin earth cases and arthritis examples ((s) >externalism, >arthritis/shmartritis). |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burge, T. | Loar Vs Burge, T. | Stalnaker II 202 That-Sentence/Psychological Content/Loar: Thesis: psychological content is not always identical to what is captured by a that-sentence. There is only one loose match. Ascription/attribution/content/Principle/attribution principles/ascription principles/Loar/Stalnaker: there are two principles that Loar wants to prove false: 1. equality (Sameness) de dicto or indirect ascriptions implies equality of psychological content. 2. differences de dicto and indirect ascriptions imply differences in psychological content. LoarVsBurge: he accepts these two principles when he says that in normal declarations of conduct we actually attribute broad content. LoarVsBurge: if we negate the two principles, we can avoid assuming that it is further content that we attribute. StalnakerVsLoar: I do not understand his two principles because I do not see how to distinguish the content of normal belief ascriptions from the references of that-sentences. One could at best say a) the expressions (that-sentences) are either the same or different, b) the referencces (the that-sentences) are the same or different. Ad a): then the principles have no sense at all. The 1st principle (that the equality of belief ascriptions requires equality of content) would be wrong if the that-sentences are context-dependent. Loar forbids index words here, but also general terms can be context dependent, then the principle is wrong even for broad content! II 205 Privileged Access/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar's phenomenological argument for his internalism is the privileged access we have to ourselves. We know what our thoughts are about. LoarVsBurge/LoarVsExternalism: privileged access is incompatible with anti-individualism. (Camp: Loar pro internalism, Loar pro individualism). II 206 Loar: Thesis: it is hard to see how I could be wrong about my purely semantic judgment that my thought about Freud is about Freud - provided Freud exists timelessly. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Loar, B. | Avramides Vs Loar, B. | Avramidis I 29 Meaning theory/M.Th./Pragmatics/Semantics/Loar/Avramidis: (Loar 1976 p.150f) (close to Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, pro Grice) Thesis Semantics and pragmatics should not be separated. Acccording to Loar Grice is not only on the side of pragmatics. Semantics cannot be used without psychological terms. Grice: for Loar, Grice is working on the first level (see above). Loar: the line between semantics and pragmatics is difficult to draw. Def Pragmatics/Loar: must be negatively determined: all facts about language use in a community that are not semantic facts. AvramidesVsLoar: this definition of pragmatics is not the standard definition, this comes from Morris: (Foundations of the Theory of Signs) Def Syntax/Morris: the study of the relation of the characters to each other Def Semantics/Morris: the study of the relation of signs to things denominated by them Def Pragmatics/Morris: the study of the relationship between the signs and their interpreters. Thus, for Morris, any investigation involving the speaker would fall into the field of pragmatics. Also Grice’ work. I 30 On the other hand: the model of Wiggins/McDowell (sense/power theory) makes it necessary for the two of them to choose Morris’ definition of pragmatics and Loar’s. That may be why Loar rejects their model and tends to Lewis. Loar: seems to consider the distinction between the possible and actual languages within the semantics possible. Then pragmatism is something that hovers above it. AvramidesVs: one can see Lewis’ model also differently: Thesis The distinction of actual/possible languages is parallel to the distinction semantics/pragmatics by Morris. (And does not bring many new aspects either) AvramiesVsLoar: misinterpretation: he seems to believe that if we accept a layer model of the theory of meaning, we have to keep the levels isolated. Then he fears that Grice would solely be attributed to pragmatics. (Loar 1927, p.149). McDowell/Avramides: according to his interpretation it would not be like that. Here we have an overall picture that includes semantics and pragmatics. Layer Model/M.Th./Avramides: allows a reconciliation of Grice’ approach with the formal M.Th. by Frege/Davidson. I 31 Problem: the reconciliation must be acceptable to both sides. Anyway, according to Loar the distinction pragmatics/semantics is anything but merely terminological: M.Th./Philosophy of mind/Loar: M.Th. is part of the theory of mind, and not vice versa. Loar/Avramides: that means that Loar can only understand the fundamental nature of semantic concepts by reference to psychological terms. (> camp). Therefore he takes a reductive position. Grice: is part of semantics according to Loar. And semantics must be reduced to psychology. I 78 Reduction/Avramides: the question is whether we may use psychological concepts in the analysans that do not rely on just the semantic terms that we first wanted to analyze. Reductive Interpretation/Grice/Avramides: the reductive one has yet another claim: if successful, it should show that our notion of meaning is secondary to our psychological concepts in the overall scheme (overall scheme). I 79 AvramidesVsSchiffer/AvramidesVsLoar: a reduction of the semantic on the psychological does not work because of the second form of circularity. I 110 Cartesianism/Loar: he sees his rejection above all in the rejection of what he called "non-naturalism". AvramidesVsLoar: but those who have the intuition that belief and intentions are primarily linguistic states could reject more than just non-naturalism. I 111 Loar: the view that belief, desires and their content could be explained without assumptions about the natural language, runs the risk of drawing a picture of thinking without language. (Loar 1981 p.2) AvramidesVsLoar: Thinking is not impossible without language. ++ I 137 |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Loar, B. | Schiffer Vs Loar, B. | I 274 Belief/Loar:/Schiffer (1981): ingenious theory about the thesis: belief is a relation in the public language of the ascribing, but in which the semantic properties that determine the content, are not defined in the public language, but in the Tarski-style. I 275 Tarski-style/T-Def/Schiffer: is not of any role of (translation: prescinds from any role) that can have the expression in the communication: if "T" is defined for a language, then contains [s is T] nothing about the use of s in any population of speakers. (Tarski 1956). I 15 Individuation/Belief/Loar/Schiffer: Loar's view makes it necessary that convictions based on interpersonal attributable functional states are individuated. ((s) So actually incompatible with Tarski). SchifferVsLoar:: (see below): which is not likely to go. That leaves as the only way: (see above). a) (compatible with IBS (intention based semantics): the local (topical) thesis that belief is a relation to a mental representation (in Mentalese). That 1. the content of signs and sounds must be reduced to contents of mental states (i.e. their intentional properties that are attributed to that-propositions). 2. then the contents of mental states are reduced to semantic properties of non-public language of mental representations that realize these mental states. ((s) representations implement mental states). Non-public language/Problem: the semantic properties of the non-public language of formulas in the inner system are contingent (!) properties! That means they require a theory that tells us what the truth conditions intends for sentences in Mentalese. This is a difficult legacy. Belief/Schiffer: but must be able to be explained without psychological vocabulary. (see above). ((s) representations/Schiffer/(s): must be explained in a non-public language, or the declaration itself in a public language, but as a phenomenon must be recognized that their contents are determined in a non-public language. (Non-public: E.g. attribution of truth values, but also Mentalese, content of mental states, etc.). I 34 SchifferVsLoar/SchifferVsFolk psychology: there are not nearly enough M-restrictions in a possible folk psychology, that by definition must be accessible to everybody, E.g. the belief that New Zealand is not a dictatorship: with which "observation moderate belief" (or amounts of such) is this belief to be connected via M-restrictions?. SchifferVsFolk psychology: they can not afford the functionalist reduction. I 45 Belief/Proposition/Loar/Schiffer: (Loar, 1981) began with propositions of belief objects, but then showed how it manages without the benefit of linguistic entities. SchifferVsLoar: 1. gives no completely general proposal. Its only meta condition is supplied from a common sense theory which is applicable only to normal adults. I 46 Problem: it is a consequence of Loar's theory that E.g. the predicate "believes that the New Yorker publishes Ved Metha" in my idiolect is partially defined by a common sense theory, which is incorrect for the blind and therefore, as I use the predicate, the proposition "Ved Metha believes that the New Yorker publishes Ved Metha" cannot be correct, because Ved Metha is blind. 2. Loar's theory is not immune to twin-earth examples and Burges examples. (He is aware of that). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Loar, B. | Stalnaker Vs Loar, B. | II 195 Narrow Content/Loar/Stalnaker: (Loar 1987, 1988): Loar has an ingenious thesis and good examples that allow us to better understand the internalism. StalnakerVsLoar: his defense of internalism is, however, not entirely convincing. Stalnaker: I believe that something like Loar's narrow content will play a role in intentional explanation but that it will not be narrow content! II 203 Content/that-clause/Loar/Stalnaker: "loose connection": here there shall be a certain way how the world appears to the thinker and this be a purely internal characteristic of the thinker. Language/content/problem/Loar: our language is permeated by social and causal presuppositions so it can only inaccurately detect our internal content. Stalnaker: pro, but I do not think that the belief states are themselves infected one whit less causally and socially! II 204 "loose connection"/Loar: (e.g. Paul, arthrite) Problem: what things about the world of which Paul believes that he is in make Paul's convictions true? The ascription of "I have arthrite in the ankle" expresses something else than the ascription of "J’ai l’arthrite dans ma cheville". StalnakerVsLoar: I also think that this is a mystery, but about ascription. I do not think that supports an internalism. Truthmaker/conviction/possible World/poss.w./Stalnaker: are the facts about the world as it appears to Paul internal or facts on the language use in Paul's environment? Ascription/to make true/Stalnaker: to answer the question, we need a theory on what makes belief ascriptions (ascriptions of content) true or false. Solution/Stalnaker: we need a causal information-theoretical approach that uses counterfactual conditionals. And I do not see how this could go internalistic. Counterfactual conditional/co.co./Stalnaker: (externalistic) one might assume that Paul would be in another state when the world would be different. Or Paul is in his internal state iff the world is actual in this certain way. ((s) But that excludes illusions). externalistic: that would be non-internalistic because it is based on general causal regularities. Problem/Stalnaker: the same problems arise that already appeared in Loar's belief ascription. Content/Loar/Stalnaker: after Loar there are two dimensions, which are connected to a mental state: a) a purely internal content – the way how the world appears to the thinker – with it behavior is actually explained. II 205 b) a social content (to what the ascriptions refer). Stalnaker: it is not clear to me what role b) shall play. Content/StalnakerVsLoar: thesis: if we describe it properly psychological and social content fall together. Loar's examples do not show that psychological content is narrow. Loar: thesis: there are phenomenological reasons why the way the world appears to the thinker must be an internal property of the thinker. II 205 privileged access/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar's phenomenological argument for his internalism is the privileged access we have to ourselves. We know what our thoughts are about. LoarVsBurge/LoarVsExternalism: privileged access is incompatible with the anti-individualism. (Team: Loar per internalism, Loar per individualism). II 206 Loar: thesis: it is hard to see how I could be wrong about my purely semantic judgment that my thought about Freud is about Freud - assuming Freud exists timelessly. StalnakerVsLoar: this is true but why is this in conflict with the externalism? LoarVsExternalism/Stalnaker: Loar's arguments are based on observations of the externalist analysis of the reference relation. logical form: (of the argument);: I do not judge that I stand in relation R to x ("R") be an externalist conception of this relation of aboutness or reference). aboutness/"about"/Loar/Stalnaker: therefore "R" cannot be a correct analysis of the aboutness relation to which I have privileged access. aboutness/"about"/Loar: it is implausible that I, to know that my thoughts are about Freud, need an opinion on a causal-historical relation to him. Such a relation has no one properly characterized yet. StalnakerVsLoar: two things are wrong about this: 1. a philosophical analysis of a concept may be correct, even if a competent user of the concept does not know the analysis. 2. the externalism does not specify that the aboutness-relation is analyzable. Burge: proposes no analysis Kripke: (in his defense of the causal theory) does not assert that this is reductionist. Loar/StalnakerVsLoar: he is right that my "pre-critical" perspective, "that my thought that my thought about Freud is a thought about Freud" does apparently not need an externalist concept. ((s) "drastic content". see below). II 209 Context dependency/ascription/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar shows us, however, correctly that belief-ascriptions are context-dependent. And he is also right to accept realization conditions for it. Realization conditions/StalnakerVsLoar: but these give us no opportunity to come to purely internal properties of the believer Def content/Stalnaker: (whether psychological or social) is a way to put us in touch with others and to our environment. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Physicalism | Avramides Vs Physicalism | Avramides I 111 AvramidesVsPhysicalism/AvramidsVsCartesianism: both make the same mistake. In reality no perspective (God viewpoint or science of the future) can ever fathom the mental life of an individual without observing his behavior. (Davidson ditto). I 135 AvramidesVsPhysicalism: by emphasizing the difficulties of an intangible empire, he loses sight of an important insight by Descartes: The subject has a unique relation to its interior. PhysicalismVsCartesianism: turns it around: instead of first-person perspektve we have only the third person perspective. I 137 Objective mind/Asymmetry/Concept/AvramidesVsLoar/AvramidesVsPhysicalism: thesis: if one understands the mind as objective, conceptual questions can no longer be separated from superficial epistemic questions or maintain a separation between our access to what the states of mind are in themselves and the normal evidence (behavior) that affect them. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Positivism | Loar Vs Positivism | Avramides I 137 Attribution/Propositional Attitude/Theory/Loar: Thesis: the epistemology of attribution of belief and desire must be separated from its explanation. LoarVsPositivism: without the separation one succumbs to the errors of positivism, phenomenalism, behaviorism and semantic instrumentalism in relation to science. (Loar 1981 p.128). LoarVsPositivism/Avramides: his mistake: to try to formulate truth conditions in terms of document conditions. AvramidesVsLoar: Thesis: now "a priori constitutive connections between attribution of attitudes (propositional attitudes) and language behavior" are exactly what I propose. (Loar 1981 p.128). In addition, I have proposed not to separate precisely between the epistemology of the attribution of desires and beliefs from their explanation. ((s) Well, so not after all!). Do I now fall into the "positivist trap" of Loar? I do not think so. AvramidesVsLoar: his mistake is to think that only positivism can combine an approach to psychology with semantics. |
Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Loar Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Avramides I 37 Propositional Attitude/Physicalism/LoarVsQuine: Variant: allows the propositions of A to be replaced by those of B, but nothing has changed in the way people see things. In particular, we allow the propositions of some physical theory to be replaced by propositions about belief, etc., but that does not change the way we think about each other. That is the "conservative explanation". N.B.: not that the theorist did not change beliefs, but his cognitive situation is as if he did not. How can that be? I cannot explain it, but it happens. And it can serve as a cognitive solution for something that is considered a serious theoretical problem. But: for the substitution to be correct, the truths of B (set of propositions) must give way to those of A (physical theory). ((s) So to become physicalistic propositions about belief). I 38 AvramidesVsLoar/AvramidesVsReductionism: I cannot allow the truths of B to give way to those of A. (see below chapters 3 and 4) I will show that the reasons for forcing us to hold on to propositions about belief are reasons for abandoning the imperialist (physicalist) view. This even corresponds to Loar's line. |
Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Objektive Mind | Loar, B. | I Avramides 137 Loar makes the mind an objective phenomenon - AvramidesVsLoar / AvramidesVsPhysicalism: if one conceives of the mind as objectively, one can no longer separate conceptual issues from superficial epistemic questions. Or a separation between our access to what the mind is, and the normal wvidence (behavior) for mental states can not be maintained. |
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| Belief | Schiffer, St. | I 286f Glauben/SchifferVsLoar: Problem: seine Realisation einer Theorie von Glauben/Wünschen - (als Funktion von Propositionen auf physikalische Zustände) - deren funktionale Rollen von der Theorie festgelegt werden: Problem: Theorie zu finden, die jede Proposition mit einer einzigen funktionalen Rolle korreliert statt mit vielen - Schiffer: das wird nicht gehen, daher ist das Quine-Field-Argument erledigt. I 216 "glaubt"/prop Einst/Schiffer: ist semantisch einfach, in dem Sinn, dass es nicht zusammengesetzt ist. Es ist aber kein Grundbegriff. |
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