Berka I 269
LorenzenVsImp">
Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Impredicativeness: Impredicatives are concepts which are defined only by means of the propositional sets to which they themselves belong. Problems arise in connection with possible circular conclusions. To avoid paradoxes, the demand is sometimes made to avoid impredicative concepts. See also Paradoxes, Russellian Paradoxy, Poincaré._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Paul Lorenzen on Impredicativeness - Dictionary of Arguments
Berka I 266 LorenzenVsHerbrand/ConstructivismVs"Impredicativeness": fable realm of the "Impredicative". Berka I 269 LorenzenVsImpredicativeness: this condition is the one that excludes the impredicative definitions in the analysis, thus requiring the branching of the types.(1) >Type theory, >Ramified type theory, >Constructivism, >J. Herbrand. 1. P. Lorenzen, Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, in: Infinitistic Methods, (1961), 193-200_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |